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26 
Article 
The Rules Enabling Act and the 
Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson 
in Statutory Interpretation 
Martin H. Redish† 
Dennis Murashko‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
Originally enacted in 19341 and revised only slightly in 
1988,2 the Rules Enabling Act gives the Supreme Court “the 
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure.”3 It 
further specifies, however, that the rules “shall not abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right.”4 The Act’s importance is 
difficult to overstate, for it plays a foundational, and often cen-
tral, role in all federal court litigation. The Act has enabled the 
Court to promulgate rules governing civil, bankruptcy, crimi-
nal, and appellate procedure in federal courts, as well as rules 
of evidence.5 Simply put, the Act, through the various rules 
 
 †  Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, North-
western University School of Law. Copyright © 2008 by Martin H. Redish and 
Dennis Murashko. The authors would like to thank James Pfander, Alex Po-
tapov, Judge Timothy Tymkovich, and Judge Stephen Williams for their help-
ful comments. 
 ‡  J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 2007; Law Clerk to the 
Honorable Stephen F. Williams, United States Court of Appeals, District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
 1. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2000)). 
 2. See Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Car-
rington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 1012, 1029 (noting that, as between the 1934 and the 1988 versions of the 
Rules Enabling Act, “the words of the basic grant of rulemaking authority are 
similar”); see also infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000). 
 4. Id. § 2072(a), (b). 
 5. See James C. Duff, The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure Ad-
ministrative Office of the U.S. Courts, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary 
for the Bench and Bar, Oct. 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum 
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promulgated under it, in one way or another impacts every fed-
eral court litigant. 
For the sake of everyone involved in the rulemaking 
process,6 one might reasonably expect the Enabling Act to pro-
vide a clear indication of the types of rules that fall within the 
rulemakers’ authority to promulgate. Unfortunately, this has 
not proven to be the case. To this day, no real consensus has 
developed as to how the Act should be interpreted.7 This troub-
ling state of affairs has given rise to the following problem: ma-
jor rulemaking proposals generate fresh debates over what the 
rulemakers may and may not do under the Act.8 Debate, in and 
of itself, is not a bad thing. What is troubling, however, is that 
this debate underscores the confusion at the heart of the rule-
making process concerning the rules’ scope and legitimacy.9 
The principal reason why construction of the Rules Enabl-
ing Act has eluded anything approaching consensus lies in the 
two key sections of the Act.10 One section requires the rulemak-
ers “to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for 
cases in the United States district courts.”11 As Professor Ely 
observed, this section mandates that rulemaking under the Act 
concern procedural goals, which he further defined as goals 
“designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes.”12 The other opera-
 
.htm (noting the role the rules play in governing federal court proceedings). 
 6. For a useful summary of rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act, 
see id. (describing the involvement of five advisory committees—one each for 
appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence rules—the Standing 
Committee, the Judicial Conference, the United States Supreme Court, and 
Congress). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See, e.g., Lee H. Rosenthal, Back in the Court’s Court, 74 UMKC L. 
REV. 687, 699 (2006) (noting, for example, that the 2001 proposed amend-
ments to Rule 23 (class actions) generated extensive debate, after which “the 
Committee concluded that in light of the constraints on rulemaking under the 
Rules Enabling Act . . . , Congress rather than the rulemakers should address 
the role of the federal courts in national and multi-state class actions”). 
 9. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules 
Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 49 (1998) (noting 
that, “[d]espite the passage of more than six decades, neither the Court nor 
the commentators have managed to produce a workable [interpretation of the 
Rules Enabling Act],” resulting in uncertainty about the validity of proposed 
rules). 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000). 
 12. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 
723–24 (1974) (citation omitted). In a similar vein, one federal court explained: 
[Procedural] rules “are addressed to lawyers and judges in their pro-
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tive provision specifies that rulemaking under the Act “shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”13 Ely de-
fined substantive rights as rights “granted for one or more non-
procedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to 
do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.”14 
The question is, how should the two sections be construed when 
taken together? What distinguishes a permissible rule from an 
impermissible one? 
There exist basically three conceivable interpretations of 
the procedural-substantive intersection in the Rules Enabling 
Act.15 First, relying on the notion of mutual exclusivity of pro-
cedure and substance, one could construe the second section as 
nothing more than restatement of the first (the “redundancy” 
construction). Under this approach the second provision effec-
tively serves solely to place emphasis on the first. In other 
words, if a rule is to regulate procedure, then it necessarily 
cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights. Under 
this reading, which at one point represented the Court’s Enabl-
ing Act doctrine,16 the second section is redundant, doing noth-
 
fessional roles and govern the means by which disputes regarding the 
content or application of substantive rules should be resolved. The 
purpose of these rules is to achieve accuracy, efficiency, and fair play 
in litigation, without regard to the substantive interests of the par-
ties.” 
Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870, 882 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal 
Courts, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 499, 504 (1989)). 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 14. Ely, supra note 12, at 725; cf. Sims, 469 F.3d at 882 (“Substantive 
rules ‘are directed at individuals and governments and tell them to do or ab-
stain from certain conduct on pain of some sanction. Substantive rules are 
based on legislative and judicial assessments of the society’s wants and needs, 
and they help to shape the world of primary activity outside the courtroom.’” 
(quoting Wells, supra note 12, at 504)). 
 15. See infra Part I.A. The interpretations discussed in this Article as-
sume the constitutional validity of the Enabling Act itself and simply seek to 
resolve the procedural-substantive interplay. One of us previously addressed 
possible interpretations with an eye towards “tak[ing] into account [the] demo-
cratic accountability critique” of the Act. Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amulu-
ru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the 
Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1303, 1332 (2006). 
 16. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (stating the 
Enabling Act test as “whether a rule really regulates procedure[ ]—the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for 
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them”). 
For a more complete discussion of Sibbach, see infra Part II.B.2. 
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ing more than emphasizing in the negative what the first sec-
tion has already stated in the positive. 
The other two conceivable readings of the Act instead in-
terpret the second section as carving out a portion of rulemak-
ing powers granted by the first. On one reading, the statutory 
directive that rules may not affect substantive rights means 
that having any effect whatsoever on a substantive right will 
invalidate a rule. This reading strictly separates the two sec-
tions of the Enabling Act and directs that each section possess 
independent meaning. This interpretation may be labeled the 
“strict separation” reading. The construction, which has never 
commanded a majority of the Court,17 has received support in 
various Rules Enabling Act scholarship, most notably that of 
Professors Burbank18 and Ely.19 While Burbank and Ely define 
the relevant substantive rights differently,20 they agree the 
second section of the Enabling Act should be read to impose a 
strict limitation on the first, rather than act as mere redundan-
cy. 
The final conceivable reading basically amounts to the 
second approach modified by an important exception. That ex-
ception permits rules to impact substantive rights if and only if 
they do so incidentally. “Incidentally” here means, in accor-
dance with the term’s dictionary definition, both “occurring by 
chance in connection with something else” and “accompanying 
but not a major part of something.”21 Thus, on the basis of this 
interpretation of the procedural-substantive tension contained 
in the Act, a rule impacting substantive rights is permitted as 
long as the effect either could not have been anticipated at the 
 
 17. In the one case where the Court seemed to read the Enabling Act to 
invalidate any Rule affecting substantive rights, it did so in dictum. See Sem-
tek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (suggesting 
that a reading of Rule 41 as having claim-preclusive effect in other courts 
“would arguably violate” the Rules Enabling Act). 
 18. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1015, 1114 (1982) (arguing that rules promulgated under the Act 
may not affect substantive rights in a predictable and identifiable fashion). 
For a more complete discussion of Professor Burbank’s approach, see infra 
Part II.B.4. 
 19. See Ely, supra note 12, at 722 (stating that the Enabling Act should be 
interpreted as prohibiting interference with state law provisions embodying 
substantive policy). For a more complete discussion of Professor Ely’s ap-
proach, see infra Part II.B.3. 
 20. Compare infra Part II.B.3 (Ely) with infra Part II.B.4 (Burbank). 
 21. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 853 (Erin McKean ed., 2d 
ed. 2005). 
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outset by those adopting the rule (i.e., a spillover effect) or was 
anticipated but deemed necessary to the achievement of a pro-
cedural goal giving rise to the rule. We label this interpretation 
the “relaxed separation” construction of the Act because it does 
not demand as strict an enforcement of the second section as 
does the strict separation interpretation. 
An example of a rule that intentionally but incidentally af-
fects substantive rights is Rule 37, which authorizes courts to 
establish facts for purposes of the litigation, or even to dismiss 
a suit or grant a default judgment against a party violating a 
discovery order.22 Certainly, such judicial action inescapably 
impacts litigants’ substantive rights. But that effect is appro-
priately characterized as incidental because the primary goal of 
the rule is not to provide a substantive basis on which to re-
solve a suit. Rather, the primary goal is procedural—ensuring 
litigants comply with discovery orders—because discovery is 
deemed essential to the fair and accurate performance of the 
truth-finding function.23 This goal undoubtedly satisfies Ely’s 
definition of procedural goals insofar as discovery aims to pro-
mote a fair and efficient fact-finding process in litigation.24 The 
rule’s substantive effect, then, is merely a club by which courts 
can police compliance with procedural orders—a means to an 
end. Thus, the substantive effect serves a valid procedural pur-
pose by ensuring that litigants do not subvert a legitimate pro-
cedural directive. 
The relaxed separation construction of the procedural-
substantive tension in the Enabling Act approximates the 
Court’s current doctrine,25 though subsequent dicta may have 
raised questions about that.26 At no point, however, has the 
 
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i), 37(b)(1)(A)(v), (vi) (authorizing courts 
to establish facts, order dismissal, or enter default judgment, respectively, as 
discovery sanctions). 
 23. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 
51 DUKE L.J. 561, 600 (2001) (“[Discovery] aids in achieving factual accuracy 
and, in doing so, may significantly facilitate the enforcement of governing 
substantive law.”). 
 24. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 25. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“Rules 
which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate [the Rules 
Enabling Act] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system 
of rules.”). For a more complete discussion of Burlington Northern, see infra 
Part II.B.5. 
 26. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 
(2001) (“[I]t would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be 
accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the 
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Court even attempted to fashion an adequate rationalization 
for its chosen interpretive methodology. In other words, the 
Court has not explained why the relaxed separation construc-
tion should prevail over the other two. Moreover, the Court’s 
chosen interpretive mode has been the subject of intensive (and 
largely unanswered) scholarly attack.27 
Each of the above three readings—redundancy, strict sepa-
ration (i.e., any substantive impact invalidates a rule), and re-
laxed separation (i.e., an incidental effect on substantive rights 
does not invalidate a rule)—represents a plausible construction 
of the Enabling Act’s text.28 This plausibility, combined with 
the lack of a textually inevitable interpretation, likely explains 
why the last seventy years of doctrine and scholarship have 
failed to produce a generally accepted construction of the pro-
cedural-substantive interplay in the Act’s two key provisions. 
Our goal in this Article is to resolve the procedural-
substantive tension in the Enabling Act’s text and, in the 
course of doing so, to glean an important lesson in statutory in-
terpretation. In construing a statute, an interpreter usually has 
to select—either implicitly or explicitly—among several availa-
ble theories of statutory construction: an interpretation within 
the four corners of the statute,29 a legislative history-driven 
search for the actual intent of the enacting legislators,30 or a 
contextualist analysis that directs judges to interpret ambi-
guous statutory text in the context of objectively determined 
statutory purposes.31 The last approach instructs judges to in-
fer statutory purposes from a synthesis of statutory text, legis-
lative history, and the social and legal contexts of the statute. 
The interpreting judge’s task in using this approach is to em-
ploy a broadly based purposive inquiry in an effort to determine 
which purposes would have been recognizable by a reasonable, 
intelligent bystander observing the passage of the statute. The 
determination is objective because it posits as the interpretive 
key a reasonable observer or legislator rather than one or more 
of the enacting legislators with their subjective intentions. 
 
internal procedures of the rendering court itself. Indeed, such a rule would ar-
guably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act . . . .”). 
 27. See, e.g., infra note 43. 
 28. See infra Part I.A. 
 29. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 30. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 31. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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The lesson we seek to impart is that the Rules Enabling 
Act serves as a quintessential illustration of a statute whose 
ambiguous text must be interpreted in light of objectively de-
termined background purposes, rather than via a narrow focus 
on either the literal meaning of the text or the specifics of legis-
lative history. This is so for two reasons. First, when statutory 
text is ambiguous, simultaneously giving rise to several con-
ceivable interpretations (as is the case with the procedural-
substantive interplay in the Enabling Act),32 it makes little 
sense to employ the four-corners approach, which effectively 
requires interpretation of individual words without regard for 
an overall sense of the statute.33 To glean that overall sense, 
unless the text permits only one construction, an interpreter 
must often venture beyond the narrow confines of the text. 
Second, a statute such as the Rules Enabling Act, which on its 
four corners provides only limited interpretive guidance, does 
not lend itself to interpretation through slavish resort to an as-
sessment of the actual legislative intent of its enactors.34 In 
enacting a sparsely worded statute, legislators as a group are 
unlikely to have thought through, much less reached consensus 
on, the statute’s various applications in specific and frequently 
unforeseeable circumstances. Thus, the ambiguous text in the 
Rules Enabling Act, capable of several textually plausible in-
terpretations, should be construed to facilitate the objectively 
determined purposes that a reasonable observer, using her 
knowledge of the relevant legal and social context and a good 
measure of common sense, would have understood to be the ob-
jective that the Act seeks to reach. The interpreter must then 
determine how a particular dispute over statutory application 
must be resolved in order to attain that endpoint. 
To a reasonable bystander observing the passage of the 
Enabling Act, two underlying purposes should have been readi-
ly apparent: (1) creating a uniform and effective system of pro-
cedural rules for the federal courts, while (2) preserving the 
substantive lawmaking power for Congress,35 free from chal-
 
 32. See infra Part I.A. 
 33. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 35. While we are focusing on substantive rights under federal law, our in-
terpretation of the Rules Enabling Act does not turn on whether affected subs-
tantive rights are grounded in state or federal law. The interpretation applies 
with equal force no matter the source of a substantive right in question. We 
concentrate on federal substantive law simply to avoid the unnecessary com-
plication presented by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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lenge or threat from the Supreme Court’s newly created rule-
making authority.36 The inquiry then becomes, which of the 
three conceivable interpretations of the procedural-substantive 
interplay best facilitates the achievement of the two purposes? 
We argue the incidental-effects—or, relaxed separation—
interpretation fashioned by the Court in Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co. v. Woods37 most effectively promotes the two 
background purposes of the Enabling Act. Unlike the redun-
dancy reading, the incidental-effects test furthers the goal of 
preserving substantive policymaking for Congress.38 The test 
recognizes that it is not enough for a rule to promote a proce-
dural goal; the rule also may not infringe a substantive right, a 
matter of congressional prerogative. But the incidental-effects 
test also rejects the strict separation reading that invalidates 
every rule having any effect on substantive rights. In so doing, 
the test appropriately recognizes that some provisions—for ex-
ample, discovery sanctions provided for in Rule 3739—while 
they clearly and inevitably affect substantive rights, are never-
theless necessary to enforce compliance with the various rules. 
Compliance with the rules’ procedural directives promotes un-
iformity and makes the rules effective, thus facilitating the 
other main purpose of the Act. 
To support our choice of the incidental-effects construction 
of the Rules Enabling Act, we draw upon the seventy-plus 
years of Enabling Act doctrine and scholarship. By examining 
the works of courts and scholars that mistakenly advocate ei-
ther the redundancy or strict separation constructions of the 
Act, we underscore the fallacies inherent in these modes of in-
terpretation: both, in various ways, undermine the two overrid-
ing purposes unambiguously sought to be achieved by the Act’s 
adoption. It is not surprising that every argument in favor of 
the redundancy or strict separation reading was based on an 
interpretation searching either for a four-corners meaning of 
statutory text or for the actual intent of the enacting legislative 
body—both wholly divorced from any inquiry into the extent to 
which these modes of construction actually further the Act’s 
long range goals. Only when the Burlington Northern Court 
 
 36. See infra Part II.A. Notably, the two purposes “are potentially in ten-
sion—a fact of which the drafters appear to have been blissfully unaware.” 
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1332. 
 37. 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
 38. See infra Part II.B.5. 
 39. See discussion supra notes 22–24. 
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chose a method of statutory construction that most effectively 
implemented the Act’s background purposes did it arrive at the 
most sensible interpretive conclusion. The Burlington Northern 
decision aside, however, the last seven decades of scholarly and 
judicial constructions of the Act provide ample illustration of 
statutory interpretation theory gone awry. 
This Article proceeds in three steps. Part I explains the 
procedural-substantive tension in the two relevant sections of 
the Enabling Act by exploring and categorizing the three con-
ceivable interpretations of those provisions. It also introduces 
the three broad theories of statutory interpretation potentially 
implicated in the Act’s construction. Part II then works through 
the various interpretations of the Enabling Act that have been 
fashioned in its more than seven-decade-long history. This his-
torical analysis enables us to advance our thesis that ambi-
guous and sparsely worded statutes such as the Enabling Act 
should be interpreted in light of the objectively determined 
purposes that would have been understood by a reasonable bys-
tander observing the enactment, rather than by either a literal 
and narrow examination of the text’s four corners or a fruitless 
attempt to discern the subjective intent of those making up the 
enacting legislative body. 
Finally, Part III explains the Burlington Northern test and 
proposes a modification by removing the blanket presumption 
of validity that the Court bestowed upon every existing rule. 
The Court viewed existing rules to be beyond objection because 
they had traveled through several checking mechanisms on 
their way to promulgation: “the study and approval given each 
proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Confe-
rence, and this Court, and the statutory requirement that the 
Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review before tak-
ing effect.”40 In Part III, recognizing the relevant institutional 
disadvantages of Congress and the Court during the rulemak-
ing process, we suggest an alternative set of presumptions that 
does not readily postulate every rule’s validity. 
While the lessons for the theory of statutory construction to 
be gleaned from our examination of the Rules Enabling Act are 
important, the practical stakes of this interpretive battle are 
also quite high. If the Court were today to adopt either the re-
dundancy or strict-separation constructions of the Act, serious 
harm to the uniformity and integrity of the federal rules would 
 
 40. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987). 
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result.41 Indeed, it is for this very reason that the incidental-
effects construction makes so much sense. As we have noted, 
currently the Court appears to employ the incidental-effects 
construction.42 However, in adopting this interpretive mode the 
Court has failed miserably in its efforts either to rationalize the 
test, ground it in the Act’s text and purpose, or explain it in 
terms of a coherent theory of statutory interpretation. Moreo-
ver, the test has on occasion been vigorously attacked by res-
pected commentators,43 and in more recent dicta the Court it-
self has seemingly wavered in its adherence to the test.44 Thus, 
this Article operates simultaneously on two levels: (1) as a les-
son in the theory of statutory construction, gleaned from a de-
tailed examination of one particular statute; and (2) as an effort 
to provide an intellectual grounding for the incidental-effects 
construction of the Rules Enabling Act, in an attempt to fortify 
that test against misguided scholarly and judicial attacks. 
I.  THREE THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES 
ENABLING ACT 
In order to understand the lesson in statutory interpreta-
tion that we derive in Part II, one first needs to grasp the in-
terpretive ambiguity inherent in the Enabling Act and the tools 
of statutory construction available to an interpreting judge. To 
that end, this Part first explains the source of persistent inter-
pretive ambiguities in the Enabling Act and then describes the 
methodologies of various statutory interpretation theories. 
A. AMBIGUITIES: PROCEDURE, SUBSTANCE, OR BOTH? 
The two relevant provisions of the Enabling Act are as 
brief as they are cryptic. Section 2072 defines both the grant of 
and the limitation on rulemaking under the Act.45 In paragraph 
(a)—what we refer to as the “enabling” provision—the Act pro-
 
 41. See infra Parts II.B.2–4. 
 42. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5; see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. 
Chromatic Commc’ns. Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991) (following Burlington 
Northern and explaining that rules having incidental effects on litigants’ subs-
tantive rights do not violate the Rules Enabling Act). 
 43. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 2, at 1016 (describing the Court’s ap-
proach as “flawed,” with regard to both interpretation and practical applica-
tion). 
 44. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 
(2001). 
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
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vides: “The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence 
for cases in the United States district courts (including proceed-
ings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”46 
Paragraph (b), in turn, defines the limitation on the power 
granted in paragraph (a): “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.”47 As a shorthand, we will re-
fer to paragraph (b) as the “limiting” provision. Thus, the basic 
question is simply this: what, if anything, does the limiting 
provision (focusing on insulation of litigants’ substantive 
rights) carve from the powers granted under the enabling pro-
vision (focusing on the Court’s authority to regulate procedure 
in the federal courts)? 
Before proceeding, it is worth pausing to define how we 
construe the terms procedure and substance. Professor Ely has 
supplied useful definitions. Rules impacting procedure are “de-
signed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient me-
chanism for the resolution of disputes.”48 Substantive rights, on 
the other hand, are rights “granted for one or more nonproce-
dural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do 
with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.”49 
There are three plausible interpretations of a synthesis of 
the two provisions. On one reading, the limiting portion of the 
Enabling Act might be nothing more than mere redundancy, 
meaning that it does not overlap with the enabling provision 
but simply restates it in a negative fashion. If we assume—
contrary to what we now know50—that rules regulating proce-
 
 46. Id. § 2072(a). Congress amended the Act in 1988 and created the sub-
sections quoted in the main text. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
§ 401(a), 102 Stat. 4648 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077). Oth-
er than minor stylistic changes, however, the import of the Act largely re-
mained faithful to the original legislation of 1934. In 1934, the relevant por-
tion read: 
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to 
prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States 
and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, 
writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil 
actions at law. 
Burbank, supra note 18, at 1097–98 (quoting the Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. 
No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077)). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). The 1934 version read: “Said rules shall neither 
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.” Burbank, 
supra note 18, at 1098 (quoting Act of June 19, 1934). 
 48. Ely, supra note 12, at 724 (citation omitted). 
 49. Id. at 725. 
 50. See Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1311 (“[A] notion [of mutual 
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dure by definition fail to impact substantive rights, then it is 
clear the limiting provision is mere redundancy. To say that 
rules cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right is 
to state nothing more than a negative of the requirement that 
rulemakers promulgate only those rules that deal with proce-
dure in the federal courts. 
When the original Rules Enabling Act was promulgated in-
to law in 1934, many of its supporters believed that procedure 
and substance were indeed mutually exclusive.51 Still, there 
would have been good political reason for them to add the limit-
ing provision, even if it were assumed to be legally redundant. 
As Professor Burbank illustrated in his extensive historical 
treatment of the Act, the rhetoric of Senators opposing the 
Act—for example, Senator Walsh—evidenced their belief that 
procedure and substance might not be all that exclusive.52 The 
redundancy, then, could be seen as an effective way of appeas-
ing the political opposition. By adding the limiting provision, 
supporters of mutual exclusivity could have been saying some-
thing like, “while we believe the limiting provision is unneces-
sary, we choose to include it in the Act to make it doubly clear 
that rulemaking under the Enabling Act cannot spill over into 
the substantive territory.”53 Thus, assuming for purposes of ar-
gument the accuracy of the mutual exclusivity analysis, con-
struing the limiting provision in the Enabling Act as redundan-
cy makes good sense in light of what the Act’s proponents tried 
to accomplish.54 
One might reasonably object that the redundancy reading 
runs directly counter to the well-known descriptive canon of 
statutory interpretation that suggests nothing in statutory text 
is surplusage.55 But the canon, when critically examined, might 
 
exclusivity is] now universally recognized to be woefully unrealistic.”). 
 51. See id. at 1312 (describing the importance of the Act’s limiting lan-
guage to the reformers’ acceptance of the judiciary’s rulemaking scope). 
 52. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1112 ( “[I]t may be that those who dis-
agreed with [Senator Walsh] on the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1926 and 
1928 interpreted [his complaints] to include the objection that the bill autho-
rized rulemaking in discrete areas properly governed by state law.”). 
 53. See Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1312 (“[T]he [limiting] lan-
guage of the Rules Enabling Act codified the reformers’ belief that as long as 
the judiciary limited its scope to ‘procedural’ matters and not ‘substantive’ 
ones, it would not encroach on legislative functions.”); id. at 1324. 
 54. See infra note 59 for an analogy to the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, which could be construed as nothing more than a rhetorical ex-
clamation mark. 
 55. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Deci-
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lose its bite for several reasons. First, descriptive canons draw 
their strength from the assumption that they accurately gene-
ralize how legislators communicate through text.56 When that 
assumption breaks down, so too does the canon’s claim to valid-
ity. In particular, the canon presuming the absence of surplu-
sage has long been criticized for assuming something quite un-
realistic about Congress—namely, that legislators are aware of 
how the various parts of the statute intertwine.57 One can rea-
sonably ignore the surplusage canon on this ground alone,58 but 
ignoring the canon becomes even easier in light of the fact that 
the redundant provision in the Rules Enabling Act actually 
served an important strategic purpose in helping to placate 
those opposed to the Act.59 
 
sion and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395, 404 (1950) (“Every word and clause must be given effect.” 
(citing HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 60 (2d ed. 1911) and JOHN LEWIS, J. G. SU-
THERLAND’S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 380 (2d ed. 1904)); 
see also Ely, supra note 12, at 719 (arguing that under the redundancy con-
struction, “[one] would never know” that the Act contained two separate limi-
tations). 
 56. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should 
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 572 (1992) (“By 
and large, descriptive canons are somewhat accurate generalizations of the 
way legislators communicate through statutory text.”). 
 57. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and 
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812–13 (1983). 
 58. There are two additional reasons for ignoring the surplusage canon in 
a particular case. First, the drafter might want to restate an earlier provision 
using the language that, to the drafter, appears clearer. See Ross, supra note 
56, at 572 n.60. Second, a legislator might insist on a superfluous phrase simp-
ly because the phrase is her own and she would like to claim credit for drafting 
it. See id. 
 59. Regarding the usefulness of redundancy as an exclamation point, it is 
helpful to compare statutory exclamation marks to those in the Constitution. 
The Tenth Amendment, one could argue, was added to serve one discrete 
role—that of appeasing those who opposed the passage of the Bill of Rights on 
the grounds that the Bill would signal expansive federal government powers 
in areas not protected by the enumerated rights. The proponents of the Bill of 
Rights said, and we paraphrase, “we know it’s redundant, but we’ll put our 
quills where our mouths are and add an exclamation point to appease the op-
position.” See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The 
amendment states but a truism[,] . . . . its purpose [being] to allay fears that 
the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and 
that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.”); 
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733–34 (1931) (“The Tenth Amend-
ment was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were 
reserved to the states or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as 
originally ratified . . . .”). In statutes as in constitutions, then, redundancy can 
 2008] RULES ENABLING ACT 39 
 
The other two conceivable constructions of the Enabling 
Act begin with the understanding that regulating procedure 
and impacting substance are in no sense mutually exclusive. 
Rejection of mutual exclusivity better comports with modern 
understanding of the procedural-substantive intersection.60 
Many of the current rules—for example, Rules 8(a) (notice 
pleadings),61 11 (sanctions),62 13(a) (compulsory counter-
claims),63 23 (class actions),64 26–37 (discovery),65 and 56 
(summary judgment)66—readily illustrate the significant im-
pact of provisions regulating procedure on litigants’ substantive 
rights.67 Unless one were to focus solely on the captioning re-
quirement of Rule 10,68 or comparable housekeeping provisions, 
one is likely to see procedure having an inevitable spillover im-
pact on substance.69 
Rejection of the assumption of mutual exclusivity leads one 
to focus on the two remaining interpretations of the procedural-
substantive tension in the Act. If the limiting provision does 
something more than redundantly restate the requirement that 
the rules deal with procedure, then the substantive rights 
clause must somehow restrict the bundle of powers that the 
enabling provision grants to the rulemakers. But recognition of 
this fact fails, in and of itself, to specify the magnitude of the 
carved out portion. 
On one reading, a rule that in any way abridges, enlarges, 
or modifies substantive rights is prohibited by the limiting pro-
vision. So construed, the Act implicitly acknowledges that rules 
of procedure may have substantive impact, and includes the 
substantive right qualifier as a means of confining legitimately 
authorized procedural rules to only those having absolutely no 
discernable substantive impact. Under this construction, for 
example, Rule 37(d) would necessarily be deemed invalid be-
 
serve a useful rhetorical purpose. 
 60. Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1314. 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 67. Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1324–25 & nn.99–103. 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (“Every pleading must have a caption with the 
court’s name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation.”). 
 69. See supra notes 48–49. 
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cause it authorizes dismissal of the complaint if the plaintiff 
has ignored a discovery request.70 
The other conceivable construction of the Act similarly 
treats the limiting provision as a restriction on the enabling 
provision. But this reading allows the rules to affect substan-
tive rights when the effect is incidental to an overriding proce-
dural purpose. The word “incidental,” in this context, means 
that the rule’s primary purpose is to achieve a valid procedural 
goal and not to affect litigants’ substantive rights.71 The rule’s 
effect on substantive rights is thus only of unintended or non-
essential importance. If we again take Rule 37(d) as an exam-
ple, it is easy to see what is meant by incidental effects. When 
the rule allows courts to dismiss a complaint as a sanction for a 
litigant’s disregard of a discovery request, assumedly the pri-
mary goal is to police discovery abuses that threaten to under-
mine the truth-finding mission of the judicial process. Logical-
ly, then, it follows that the primary objective of the rule is to 
allow both parties to discover whatever facts are necessary to 
prosecute or defend a particular lawsuit. To be sure, on occa-
sion such requests might appropriately be deemed abusive or 
oppressive. But in such an event, the rulemakers must have be-
lieved, the efficiency and integrity of the litigation system is 
fostered by requiring the party from whom discovery is sought 
to affirmatively respond to the request by pointing out its ille-
gality or inappropriateness. To assure that the litigants comply 
with the terms of this arrangement, the rulemakers chose to 
vest broad sanctioning powers in the district court. The rule, 
then, functions very much like a substantive club that judges 
can wave above litigants’ heads to encourage an orderly discov-
ery process. Acceptance of a separation reading of the limiting 
provision that nonetheless permits the rules to impact substan-
tive rights when the effect is only incidental to a broader proce-
dural purpose would necessarily validate rules such as Rule 
37(d). 
Both separation readings—the strict (absolutely no effect 
on substantive rights permitted) and relaxed (permitting inci-
dental substantive impact) versions—are textually plausible. 
Recall the language of the limiting provision: “Such rules shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”72 The 
 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d). 
 71. We further discuss the meaning of the word “incidental” in Part III.A. 
See infra notes 318–26 and accompanying text. 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000). 
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strict reading flows from implicitly adding the following lan-
guage at the end of the limiting provision: “even if the effect on 
a substantive right is secondary to the achievement of a proce-
dural purpose.” The relaxed reading flows from the following 
addition to the limiting language of the Act: “but not if the ef-
fect on a substantive right is secondary to the achievement of a 
procedural purpose.” The additions—“even if” and “but not 
if”—are polar opposites, but each, albeit in a different way, re-
fines and clarifies the limiting provision. It follows that the li-
miting provision is, purely as a textual matter, ambiguous on 
the question of the rules’ permissible intersection with substan-
tive rights. 
Each reading—mutual exclusivity/redundancy, strict sepa-
ration, and relaxed separation—has at some point appeared in 
the Court’s decisions interpreting the procedural-substantive 
tension in the Enabling Act (though the strict separation read-
ing came only in the form of dictum).73 Respected scholars such 
as Ely and Burbank have embraced the strict separation read-
ing, albeit on the basis of very different rationales.74 But why 
does all of this matter? 
Making a choice among the three conceivable means of in-
terpreting the procedural-substantive tension is important be-
cause the choices provide rulemakers with three different an-
swers as to the parameters of the kinds of rules they can 
promulgate. As discussed, Rule 37(d) provides a perfect exam-
ple of the practical difference between the strict and relaxed 
separation readings. One reading invalidates Rule 37(d); the 
other does not. And the third reading—redundancy—defines 
the rulemakers’ boundaries in yet another way, by authorizing 
 
 73. The Court appeared to accept the redundancy reading in Sibbach. See 
Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1324 & n.98 (arguing that the mutual 
exclusivity of substance and procedure “also appears to have been the early 
Supreme Court’s view” (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 
(1941))). In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the Court embraced 
the relaxed separation reading. See 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (interpreting the Act 
to permit effects on substantive rights that are merely incidental to a broader 
procedural purpose). Since Burlington Northern, the Court has not decided a 
case challenging the validity of a Rule under the Enabling Act. But in a case 
decided in 2001, the Court indicated in dictum that it might prefer the strict 
separation reading. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497, 504 (2001) (suggesting that interpreting Rule 41(b) to interfere with the 
California statute of limitations “would seem to violate” the limiting provision 
of the Enabling Act). For more discussion of these cases, see infra Part II.B. 
 74. For more on these scholars’ theories of interpreting the Enabling Act, 
see infra Part II.B.3–4. 
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more rules as long as they touch in some way on procedural 
matters. 
Thus, which interpretation of the Enabling Act’s procedur-
al-substantive tension rulemakers or interpreting courts select 
might very well dictate what types of rules they are authorized 
to promulgate. Indeed, the choice goes to the heart of rulemak-
ing. It is only appropriate, then, to attempt to resolve which in-
terpretation should govern. 
B. AVAILABLE THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
If the text of the Enabling Act plausibly supports three in-
terpretations of rulemaking authority that differ so dramatical-
ly in scope, how should an interpreting judge decide on the cor-
rect approach? Since the statute’s enactment, the Court at 
various points has tried each of the conceivable interpretations, 
but there is no definitive guidance at present.75 No court or 
scholar has considered the tension in light of available theories 
of statutory interpretation. The remainder of this Part explains 
in detail three methods of statutory interpretation: four-
corners, intentionalism, and contextualism.76 
1. Four-Corners: A Literalist Construction of Text 
One possible approach to statutory interpretation is the 
four-corners construction. The term “four-corners” refers to a 
 
 75. The Court’s most recent authoritative statement is in Burlington 
Northern, 480 U.S. at 1, but the dictum in Semtek, which seemingly contra-
dicts the Burlington Northern analysis, did not produce a single concurrence 
or dissent. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503. 
 76. We do not address in this Article the interpretation of the Rules 
Enabling Act that would flow from use of the so-called dynamic interpretation 
theory advanced by Professor Eskridge. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). “[T]he judiciary, from the 
dynamist perspective, acts as an adjunct in the legislative process or, more 
precisely, a super legislature.” Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Demo-
cratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism 
in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 807 (1994). Proponents of dy-
namic interpretation have not yet persuaded us that the federal judiciary may 
question the wisdom of Congress in enacting statutes, which is what dynamic 
interpretation authorizes federal judges to do. See generally id. at 831–58 (de-
scribing and criticizing dynamic statutory interpretation). Moreover, the ap-
proach is not readily embraced and acknowledged in the judiciary, even 
though some claim that it accurately describes what courts do when faced with 
statutory indeterminacies. See Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Con-
gress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (“Although few jurists would claim to 
practice dynamic statutory interpretation, some scholars claim it is a descrip-
tively accurate account of how judges deal with indeterminate statutes.”). 
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theory, used in the early twentieth century, to suggest that sta-
tutory text must be interpreted without reference to anything 
outside the page on which it is written.77 Under this theory, an 
interpreting judge does not look to purpose, context, or whatev-
er else might help clarify an ambiguous statute. The judge es-
sentially assumes that every interpretation can be conducted 
within the four corners of a statute—effectively in a legal, so-
cial, and political vacuum. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. United States78 
illustrates the four-corners approach. The defendant sought to 
purchase cocaine, using a gun as payment.79 The jury convicted 
the defendant on drug-related charges and enhanced the sen-
tence because the defendant had used a gun.80 The statute pro-
viding for the enhancement required that “during and in rela-
tion to any . . . drug trafficking crime,” the defendant “use[] . . . 
a firearm.”81 The defendant asked the Court to overturn the 
enhancement because the term “use” connoted using a gun as a 
weapon. The Court, in a 6-3 opinion, disagreed and read “use” 
to encompass the use of a gun as payment for cocaine. 
Justice Scalia dissented. He explained, “When someone 
asks, ‘Do you use a cane?,’ he is not inquiring whether you have 
your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in 
the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane.”82 A 
 
 77. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108–09 (2001). This approach is sometimes labeled “strict 
construction,” “plain meaning,” or “literalism.” See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (“Textualism should not be confused 
with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that 
brings the whole philosophy into disrepute.”); Manning, supra, at 108–09 
(“Modern textualists, however, are not literalists. In contrast to their early-
twentieth-century predecessors in the ‘plain meaning’ school, they do not claim 
that interpretation can occur ‘within the four corners’ of a statute, or that ‘the 
duty of interpretation does not arise’ when a text is ‘plain.’ Rather, modern 
textualists acknowledge that language has meaning only in context. . . . [T]hey 
believe that statutory language, like all language, conveys meaning only be-
cause a linguistic community attaches common understanding to words and 
phrases, and relies on shared conventions for deciphering those words and 
phrases in particular contexts.”). We use the term “four-corners” because it is 
most descriptive of what actually happens when a judge from this school of 
statutory interpretation construes text. 
 78. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). Both Justice Scalia and Professor Manning use 
this illustration. See SCALIA, supra note 77, at 23–24; Manning, supra note 77, 
at 110. 
 79. See Smith, 508 U.S at 225. 
 80. See id. at 226–27. 
 81. See id. at 227 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1990)). 
 82. See id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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literalist four-corners interpreter, however, would construe the 
words “use a cane” as extending to canes hanging on a wall as 
decoration, for the simple reason that, at least in some sense, 
displaying a cane is “using” it. Similarly, a literalist interpre-
ter83 would read the words, “use a firearm” to include the use of 
a gun as payment. A judge not wedded to a literal construction 
of text, on the other hand, might inquire into the context and 
determine that a cane inquiry refers to walking with a cane, 
and a gun inquiry to using a gun as a weapon. But a literalist 
judge does nothing of the sort. 
Another example along the same lines comes from Black-
stone.84 He pointed to a Bolognese statute that provided, 
“whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the 
utmost severity.”85 The obvious purpose of the statute is to con-
trol against street violence. A good Samaritan, who happens to 
be a surgeon, sees a person in pain, realizes that an immediate 
surgery is required to save the person’s life, and operates right 
there on the street. In the course of the surgery, the good Sa-
maritan literally draws blood. He is charged under the statute. 
A literalist interpreter likely would say that the statute 
applies to the good Samaritan. He did, after all, draw blood in 
the streets. A judge willing to look beyond the narrow four cor-
ners, on the other hand, may recognize that the statute is am-
biguous as to whether it covers good Samaritans as well as vio-
lent criminals. The next step for such a judge might be to 
consider the statute in light of its commonsense purpose. And 
since the purpose is to punish street violence—not to prevent 
people from helping those in need—our good Samaritan escapes 
punishment. Again, though, a four-corners judge sees words on 
a piece of paper and nothing else. 
As both the Smith decision and Blackstone’s example illu-
strate, the four-corners interpretive approach forces judges to 
 
 83. Justice Scalia acknowledged that he could not know whether his col-
leagues in Smith had ruled the way they had because they were relying on 
four-corners interpretation or for some other reason. See SCALIA, supra note 
77, at 24. The purpose of using the example, though, is merely to illustrate 
how the approach would function. 
 84. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59–60 (commenting on 
the “fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator”). 
 85. Id. (“[W]here words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if 
literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of 
them . . . . [T]he Bolognian law . . . was held after long debate not to extend to 
the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a 
fit”). 
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operate as if statutory text exists in a vacuum. Thus, “using a 
gun” takes on all meanings of the word “use,” including using a 
gun as payment for something else. And a good Samaritan is 
guilty of “drawing blood” in the course of operating on a person 
in need. That these results might defy common sense, or at the 
very least appear inconsistent with relatively clear statutory 
purpose, is of no concern to a four-corners interpreter. 
2. Intentionalism and Legislative History 
In contrast to judges who employ the four-corners interpre-
tation, intentionalists seek to construe statutes in a manner 
designed to advance the actual intent of the enacting legislative 
body, at least as the interpreter perceives that intent.86 They 
may attempt to achieve this goal in one of two ways: archeolog-
ical and hypothetical.87 The archeological inquiry asks whether 
the enacting legislature has provided a signal as to how the 
disputed statutory issue is to be resolved. Even if the statutory 
text is unambiguously clear, the intentionalist would still look 
to legislative history, since text is merely one indication of leg-
islative intent; it is by no means the only indication.88 
 
 86. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation 
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325 (1990) (describing the judi-
ciary as the “legislature’s faithful servant” in “discovering and applying the 
legislature’s original intent”).  
 87. See Frost, supra note 76, at 11–13 (briefly describing the intentional-
ist approach); Redish & Chung, supra note 76, at 813–14 & n.33 (noting that 
the use of the term “archeological” is merely descriptive, rather than pejora-
tive); infra Part I.B.3. 
 88. See Redish & Chung, supra note 76, at 813 (“[T]he statute’s text would 
be one logical source of . . . a[n] [intentionalist] determination, but it is by no 
means necessarily dispositive.”). This indiscriminate resort to legislative his-
tory is the reason why Justices who do not belong to this interpretive school 
frequently write separately to indicate their displeasure with peeking outside 
the text when it is unambiguous. See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & As-
socs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1028 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) 
(refusing to make his construction of an unambiguous statute “contingent on 
[modern] trends . . . [ ]or . . . on the ostensible ‘concerns’ of [its] drafters”); 
Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 999 (2008) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part) (joining the majority’s reasoning except for parts “that rely on 
the reports of committees of one House of Congress to show the intent of that 
full House and of the other—with regard to propositions that are apparent 
from the text of the law, unnecessary to the disposition of the case, or both”); 
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510–11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and in the judgment) (declining to join the majority’s use of legislative 
history to confirm the meaning of an unambiguous statute because “if legisla-
tive history is relevant when it confirms the plain meaning of the statutory 
text, it should also be relevant when it contradicts the plain meaning, thus 
rendering what is plain ambiguous”). 
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Suppose, for example, that a local ordinance forbids dogs in 
city parks. What if someone wants to bring a cat for a walk in a 
park? Does the statute apply, thereby excluding cats from 
parks? Assume that the cat-walker is fined for bringing the cat 
into a city park and wants to contest the fine. What result? In 
this situation, the job of a literalist (or even a less narrowly fo-
cused textualist) is relatively easy: the text of the statute men-
tions dogs, not cats. Case closed. Expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius: the mention of only one necessarily excludes others not 
mentioned.89 But an intentionalist might very well argue that 
the text is unclear. The statute, in other words, does not specify 
what to do with respect to cats. Moreover, under an intentional-
ist interpretive model the judge would be obliged to consider 
the ordinance’s legislative history even if she determines that 
the text is clear, for again, text is only one indication of legisla-
tive intent. An archeological intentionalist judge would attempt 
to determine if the legislative history provides some clue. Sup-
pose several city aldermen have said the following in the course 
of enacting the ordinance: “The ordinance specifies that dogs 
are excluded from city parks, but this prohibition surely would 
apply to cats if someone were to bring a cat into a park.” Such a 
statement might be enough for an archeological intentionalist 
to resolve the interpretive question against the hapless cat-
walker. 
Sometimes, however, no clues are to be found in either the 
statute’s text or legislative history. In such cases, an intentio-
nalist judge moves into the hypothetical interpretive mode, apt-
ly labeled “imaginative reconstruction” by Judge Posner.90 The 
judge, in the imaginative reconstruction mode, “should try to 
think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting leg-
islators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute 
applied to the case at bar.”91 In other words, while the judge is 
no longer using the enacting legislators’ clues—by the very 
premise, there are none—she is still trying to ascertain how 
that particular legislature would have answered the disputed 
statutory provision had the legislature thought about it. 
 
 89. See SCALIA, supra note 77, at 25. 
 90. Posner, supra note 57, at 817. We should note, however, that this 
mode is not exclusive to intentionalists who have come up empty in terms of 
the statute’s text or legislative history. Any intentionalist may well choose to 
begin (and perhaps end) the interpretive inquiry in the hypothetical mode. 
 91. Id. 
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In the hypothetical example of the dog-prohibiting ordin-
ance, an intentionalist judge would turn to imaginative recon-
struction in the absence of any legislative history helpful to the 
cat-walking issue. The judge might, for example, determine 
that the enacting legislature omitted cats simply because cat-
walking is a relatively new practice. If the enacting legislators 
were actually familiar with the increasing instance of people 
walking their cats, they would have prohibited cats as well as 
dogs. The judge might therefore determine that the enacting 
legislature did not want any domestic animals in city parks, 
and enforce the ordinance accordingly. 
It is necessary at this point to raise three serious objections 
to the actual intent theory of statutory interpretation. More 
precisely, the objections go to one particular element of inten-
tionalism—the use of legislative history to derive clues and an-
swers to specific questions facing an interpreting judge. Several 
well-known problems undermine the use of legislative history 
as a source for determining the so-called actual intent of the 
enacting legislature. But even though the objections are well 
known, the discussion would be incomplete without exploring 
them. 
First, it is only statutory text that has satisfied the two 
constitutional requirements for enacting a federal statute—
bicameralism and presentment.92 Neither committee reports 
nor any other legislative history has done so. In Immigration 
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the Court could not 
have been more clear in demanding strict adherence to the dic-
tates of formalism embedded in the bicameralism and present-
ment requirements: the two constitutional requirements, the 
Court said, “prescribe and define the respective functions of the 
Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process.”93 
Thus, strict reliance on legislative history, at least at the ex-
pense of unambiguously contrary text, would be unconstitu-
tional. 
Second, even where statutory text is deemed ambiguous, 
legislative history provides at best only a limited source of leg-
islative intent. It is notoriously imprecise and on occasion even 
contradictory, enabling opposing litigants each to find state-
ments helpful to their arguments. It is important to recall 
 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House 
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented 
to the President of the United States.”). 
 93. 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983). 
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Judge Harold Leventhal’s admonition that “the use of legisla-
tive history [is] the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail 
party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s 
friends.”94 
The inherent malleability and unpredictability of legisla-
tive history in answering very specific questions facing an in-
terpreting judge gives rise to two corollary problems. First, it is 
statutory text, rather than legislative history, that provides the 
guide for private behavior. Legislative history is the domain of 
lawyers and judges, not private citizens. Second, that legisla-
tive history is so malleable is most likely a result of insufficient 
attention paid to how it is formed in the first place. As Justice 
Scalia famously quipped, “we are a Government of laws, not of 
committee reports.”95 But if a legislative committee—certainly 
not the whole or even a majority of Congress—can insert into a 
committee report preferences not expressed in statutory text, 
then the result is precisely a government of committee re-
ports.96 We have no reasonable basis for extrapolating a majori-
ty view from committee reports. Without such an extrapolation, 
to assign to legislative history dispositive effect is to turn over 
our representative government to “virtually unaccountable 
staff.”97 
Finally, a unique problem arises when an interpreter 
mines legislative history for answers to very specific questions, 
where statutory text itself is so sparse as to suggest either a 
congressional choice not to puzzle through the specifics of ap-
plication or complete unawareness of the problem in the first 
place. Justice Scalia rejected any interpretive approach that in-
vites judges to comb through legislative history for answers to 
specific questions: “For a virtual certainty, the majority [of the 
enacting Congress] was blissfully unaware of the existence of 
the [specific] issue, much less had any preference as to how it 
should be resolved.”98 
 
 94. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(recalling Judge Leventhal’s observation). 
 95. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 96. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of 
Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 650 (2006) 
(noting a troubling phenomenon of committee reports adding language to a 
statute). 
 97. Redish & Chung, supra note 76, at 823. 
 98. SCALIA, supra note 77, at 32. 
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Perhaps more important than all of the problems of practi-
cality to which resort to legislative history gives rise is the sim-
ple formalist point that it was the text, not some external in-
tent, enacted into law. Slavish reliance on some (often fruitless) 
search for legislative intent, then, improperly vaults the equiv-
alent of external codicils to a level of interpretive preeminence. 
3. Contextualism: Introducing a Purposive Element 
Similar to intentionalism, a contextualist approach to sta-
tutory interpretation permits—indeed commands—interpreting 
judges to look beyond the four corners of the statute in an effort 
to construe ambiguous statutory text. But the approach mar-
kedly differs from intentionalism in the way that it restricts 
judges in making these determinations. 
Before introducing the specifics of contextualism, it is ne-
cessary to explain our terminology. In shaping and explaining 
this mode of interpretation, we draw heavily upon the scholar-
ship of Justice Scalia and Professor Manning. But both of them 
refer to “textualism,” not “contextualism.” Our label, however, 
has the additional benefit of clearly signaling the acceptance of 
the text’s surrounding environment—its context.99 
In a well-known essay, Justice Scalia noted the sad state of 
statutory interpretation in the United States and sought to im-
prove it.100 He captured the problem in the following quote from 
the famed Hart and Sacks materials on the legal process: 
Do not expect anybody’s theory of statutory interpretation, whether it 
is your own or somebody else’s, to be an accurate statement of what 
courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter is that 
American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consis-
tently applied theory of statutory interpretation.101 
 
 99. The other problem with the term “textualism” is the confusion brought 
about by those who refer to this method as “new textualism.” Coined by Pro-
fessor William N. Eskridge, Jr., in The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(1990), the term “new textualism,” is unfortunate precisely because it gives 
rise to the false impression that there is something new about the mechanics 
of Justice Scalia’s approach. As Eskridge himself acknowledges, however, 
“Justice Scalia’s methodology is a return to the nineteenth century treatise 
approach to statutory interpretation.” Id. at 623 n.11. The reason Eskridge 
used the adjective “new” is the approach’s “intellectual inspiration: public 
choice theory, strict separation of powers, and ideological conservatism.” Id. 
Without commenting on Professor Eskridge’s perceived inspiration for Scalia’s 
textualism, we can readily conclude that the approach is not new in the sense 
that it is interpreting statutes as has never before been done in the United 
States. 
 100. See SCALIA, supra note 77. 
 101. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 
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Not satisfied with the existing state of affairs, Scalia set out to 
make a case for what we call a contextualist theory of statutory 
interpretation. 
Simply put, contextualism accomplishes two things: it di-
rects an interpreter to (1) read the words in a statute and (2) 
only when the text is vague or open-ended—that is, subject to 
more than one textually plausible construction—to interpret 
the words “in light of [the statute’s] background purpose.”102 A 
contextualist acknowledges congressional latitude in specifying 
who will flesh out a particular statute: the courts or Con-
gress.103 When a congressional majority seeks to advance “pre-
cise legislative policies, it can enact detailed and specific sta-
tutes, increasing its ability to control discretion in the 
application of its commands, but risking greater over- and un-
derinclusiveness. When flexibility is more crucial than preci-
sion, however, Congress is free to legislate in more open-ended 
terms.”104 
To interpret an ambiguous statute, a contextualist judge 
then will seek to decipher a purpose that can illuminate how a 
reasonable reader familiar with what the statute was meant to 
accomplish would have understood the ambiguity.105 This as-
pect of the contextualist analysis is, admittedly, considerably 
less precise than the first. In the first step, the task is rather 
straightforward: determine what, if anything, the text of a sta-
tute tells us about a particular issue before the court. But when 
contextualist judges have determined that the text supplies no 
unambiguous answer, what are they to do next? 
 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994), quoted in SCALIA, 
supra note 77, at 14. 
 102. Manning, supra note 77, at 107–08. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 358–60 & 
nn.32–38 (2005) (citing opinions of Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook em-
ploying legislative history to determine the objective semantic context of an 
ambiguous statute); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent 
in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63 (1988) (“To use 
an algebraic metaphor, law is like a vector. It has length as well as direction. 
We must find both, or we know nothing of value. To find length we must take 
account of objectives, of means chosen, and of stopping places identified. All 
are important.”); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposiv-
ists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75–76 (2006) (“[W]hen modern textualists find a 
statutory text to be ambiguous, they believe that statutory purpose . . . is itself 
a relevant ingredient of statutory context.”). 
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It may be helpful first to explain what the purposive part 
of contextualism is not. The purposive element of contextualism 
is not to be confused with an interpretive theory known as pur-
posivism and associated with Professors Hart and Sacks, al-
though contextualism does share with that form of purposivism 
a number of assumptions about lawmaking in Congress. 
The Hart and Sacks version of purposivism instructs an in-
terpreting judge to construe the statute in question on the basis 
of the statute’s purpose gleaned from statutory text and legisla-
tive history, as well as from “the entire legal landscape.”106 The 
theory is based on two fairly sensible assumptions about the 
legislative process. The first assumption posits a legislature 
“made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.”107 Second, “[e]very statute must be conclusively 
presumed to be a purposive act.”108 The two assumptions, taken 
together, proceed on the view that lawmakers enact laws not as 
a meaningless exercise but as a conscious effort to reach some 
objective. Contextualism shares these two very reasonable as-
sumptions with the Hart and Sacks version of purposivism.109 
Despite these shared assumptions, however, the two ap-
proaches do not fold into one. The central difference between 
contextualism and the Hart and Sacks version of purposivism 
is the relative importance of statutory text. Contextualism 
leaves no interpretive room for a judge to deviate from clear, 
unambiguous text.110 A Hart and Sacks purposivist, on the oth-
er hand, is willing “to ignore what might appear to be clear sta-
tutory text . . . in favor of an interpretation that support[s] a 
particular reading . . . of that statute’s purpose.”111 
We now turn to the methodological question: what steps 
should a contextualist judge take to determine background 
purposes of the disputed statute? The purposive component of 
 
 106. Redish & Chung, supra note 76, at 816 (describing the Hart and Sacks 
theory of statutory interpretation). 
 107. HART & SACKS, supra note 101, at 1378. 
 108. Id. at 1124. 
 109. See Redish & Chung, supra note 76, at 819 (“The idea that a legisla-
tive body aimlessly chooses words for a statute by a mental process equivalent 
to randomly selecting words from a hat is simply preposterous.”). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 816 (explaining the Hart and Sacks approach). The best known 
statement to this effect comes from Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), where the Court said: “a thing may be within 
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Justice Scalia uses the case as a 
poster child of what judges should not do. See SCALIA, supra note 77, at 18–23. 
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contextualism, while forbidding judges to displace clear statu-
tory text, instructs them to determine the disputed statute’s 
purpose by considering text and legislative history as well as by 
engaging in “a more expansive, holistic analysis that . . . al-
low[s] a judge to consider the societal context surrounding the 
statute at the time of its enactment.”112 As a result, a contex-
tualist judge, having determined that statutory text is ambi-
guous, engages in a similar search for statutory purpose that a 
Hart and Sacks purposivist undertakes. 
The contextualist search calls for use of a process akin to 
Posner’s imaginative reconstruction to help a judge glean pur-
poses from all of the contextual evidence that she has amassed. 
There is no mathematical precision in this step. It is not as if 
the judge can say empirically, by way of statistical inferences, 
that a statute’s purpose is ninety-five percent likely to be X. 
What this step requires “is more an inference drawn from an 
evaluation of the available evidence.”113 Recall the manner in 
which a Posnerian imaginative-reconstruction judge would de-
termine whether the ordinance prohibiting dogs in city parks 
applied to cats.114 Unlike a judge who looks to legislative histo-
ry to derive actual answers—for example, the statement in leg-
islative history that the ordinance is expected to apply to cats—
a judge applying imaginative reconstruction has to attempt to 
determine how the enacting legislators would have answered 
the question without the benefit of having their actual answer 
at hand. The difference between the purposive element of con-
textualism and Posner’s imaginative reconstruction is that a 
contextualist does not much care how the actual enacting legis-
lators would have resolved the interpretive question. Rather, 
the only relevant inquiry for a contextualist is how a reasona-
ble observer who is familiar with the socio-political or economic 
problem that the statute was designed to deal with or respond 
to would understand how the disputed statutory provision 
would apply to the specific factual situation before the court. A 
contextualist does care about the wishes of the actual enacting 
legislature, but only to the extent the legislature has memoria-
lized these wishes in unambiguous statutory text. 
At times a contextualist judge will need nothing but her 
own common sense to ascertain the purpose of a particular sta-
 
 112. Redish & Chung, supra note 76, at 866. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 90–91. 
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tute. In Blackstone’s good Samaritan example,115 for instance, 
the judge can determine as a matter of common sense that the 
statute punishing harshly those who “draw blood in the streets” 
does not apply to a good Samaritan who draws blood only be-
cause he has to perform a quick surgery on a person in need, 
even absent concrete evidence as to legislative intent. In other 
cases, something more than a resort to common sense may be 
required. But even then, a judge should not abandon this valu-
able tool; it may help both in sorting through all the contextual 
evidence and in determining the governing purposes. 
We previously noted that the purposive component poten-
tially involves, among other things, consideration of legislative 
history. The use of legislative history in contextualism, howev-
er, is drastically different from its central use in intentional-
ism. In a contextualist framework, the purpose could conceiva-
bly be gleaned from an examination of legislative history,116 but 
if so it is only as a way of helping to understand the surround-
ing context of a particular statute. A contextualist judge does 
not read legislative history to determine the actual subjective 
intent of the enacting Congress.117 This distinction separates 
intentionalists who rely on legislative history from contextual-
ists who also resort to the same inquiry. For contextualists, the 
concept of divining the actual intent of a legislature, when the 
legislature has not sought to express its intent in statutory 
text, is anathema in part because judges are not equipped to do 
the divining.118 Contextualism also seeks to discontinue the 
disturbing trend, which gained momentum in the late 1920s 
and 1930s, towards the use of legislative history as the primary 
interpretive inquiry, displacing the focus on statutory text.119 
 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
 116. See Nelson, supra note 105, at 358–60 & nn.32–38. 
 117. See SCALIA, supra note 77, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative his-
tory on principle, since I reject the intent of the legislature as a proper crite-
rion of the law.”). 
 118. See United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I should concur in this result more readily if 
the Court could reach it by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis 
of Congress. When we decide from legislative history, including statements of 
witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we must put our-
selves in the place of a majority of Congressmen and act according to the im-
pression we think this history should have made on them. Never having been 
a Congressman, I am handicapped in that weird endeavor. That process seems 
to me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute.”), quoted in 
SCALIA, supra note 77, at 30–31. 
 119. See SCALIA, supra note 77, at 30 (“The movement [in favor of using 
legislative history] gained momentum in the late 1920s and 1930s . . . .”). 
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In other words, they do not wish to see the following in briefs 
filed in their courts: “Unfortunately, the legislative debates are 
not helpful. Thus, we turn to the other guidepost in this diffi-
cult area, statutory language.”120 And most importantly, con-
textualism posits that legislative history should not serve as an 
end in itself. 
4. Key Differences Between the Theories: The Forest-Trees 
Problem 
Faced even with an ambiguous statute, the four-corners in-
terpreter plows ahead by interpreting the statute to advance a 
(but not necessarily the) plausible reading. An intentionalist 
judge, on the other hand, looks to legislative history to see if 
the legislature that promulgated the statute provided the an-
swer to the interpretive question facing the judge. Neither ap-
proach carefully considers the basic reasons for promulgating 
the statute in the first place. 
What unites the four-corners interpreters with intentional-
ists—and separates both from contextualists—can best be de-
scribed by the forest-trees metaphor. The forest in this meta-
phor is whatever effect a particular statute is calculated to 
have on the existing legal and social environment—how it is 
supposed to alter the existing legal topography. The trees, then, 
are all the evidence that make up the process of statutory in-
terpretation—text, legislative history, and whatever else a 
judge might consider. Notice what happens when a statute is 
ambiguous regarding a specific issue facing the interpreter121: 
four-corners and intentionalist judges both look to the trees ra-
ther than to the forest for answers. A four-corners interpreter, 
undaunted by textual ambiguities, selects a textually plausible 
reading and ends the inquiry. An intentionalist, on the other 
hand, looks to a different kind of tree. Instead of relying on 
text, she looks to legislative history and, having found an an-
swer there, concludes the interpretive exercise. Neither ap-
proach looks to the forest and asks what effect on the existing 
legal order the statute was calculated to have. 
A contextualist judge, however, recognizes that only when 
statutory text clearly and unambiguously resolves the interpre-
 
 120. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 
(1989) (No. 87-2084), quoted in SCALIA, supra note 77, at 31. 
 121. In the absence of a textual ambiguity, the approaches might converge, 
with the possible exception of an intentionalist interpretation that may still 
look to legislative history. See discussion supra Parts I.B.1–3. 
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tive question facing the judge should the judge restrict the 
analysis to the trees. More precisely, a contextualist judge un-
derstands her role to be limited to the reading of statutory text 
when that text is clear and unambiguous.122 But when statuto-
ry text is ambiguous, contextualism instructs judges to advance 
an interpretation that would help achieve the background pur-
poses underlying the statute. As we have shown,123 such an 
analysis sometimes lacks precision and may require an exami-
nation of vast amounts of evidence, as was the case with the 
Enabling Act. But that is the forest with which a contextualist 
judge must contend. Everything else is the trees, and a contex-
tualist judge does not get lost in them. A contextualist judge, 
then, is an island of common sense amidst various interpretive 
approaches that ask judges to do either too much (determining 
actual intentions of those enacting a particular statute) or too 
little (interpreting words in a vacuum). 
II.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE RULES 
ENABLING ACT 
A. DECIPHERING THE PURPOSES OF THE RULES ENABLING ACT 
In determining the purposes behind adoption of the Rules 
Enabling Act, an appropriate place to begin is Professor Bur-
bank’s extensive historical analysis of the Act. In Part III of his 
seminal Rules Enabling Act article—the section he labels “The 
Antecedent Period of Travail”—he examines in great detail the 
Act’s vast pre-enactment history.124 He commences his analysis 
in the nineteenth century with the Process Acts and the Con-
formity Act of 1872.125 He points to the then-prevailing displea-
sure with the lack of uniformity that flowed from those Acts.126 
Under the Conformity Act, for example, federal litigation in dif-
ferent states would proceed according to different procedural 
rules.127 Burbank then explains how the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) and various other reformers, intrigued by procedur-
al reforms in the State of New York, worked diligently in the 
 
 122. See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
 123. See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
 124. Burbank, supra note 18, at 1035–98. 
 125. Id. at 1036. 
 126. See id. at 1039–42. 
 127. See id. at 1040–42. 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries to enact a uniform bill of 
procedure in the federal courts.128 
Burbank discusses the involvement of a large number of 
people both inside and outside of Congress—the ABA officials 
and other reformers, United States Supreme Court Justices, 
prominent academics, and scores of legislators.129 In the end, it 
is clear from Burbank’s research that the evolution of what was 
to become the Enabling Act was in large part a result of 
“[d]evelopments in law and political theory.”130 And that is pre-
cisely what Burbank gives us: a detailed account of develop-
ments in law and political theory surrounding the passage of 
the Enabling Act. As illuminating as Burbank’s historical ex-
ploration is on one level, however, it is important not to ignore 
the value of pure textual analysis and plain common sense in 
deciphering broad legislative purpose. Painfully detailed histor-
ical analysis, as valuable as it might be in the interpretive 
process, should not be allowed to overwhelm a commonsense 
understanding of the point sought to be achieved by the legisla-
tion in a sea of historical minutiae. 
What, then, are the Enabling Act’s predominant purposes 
that would have been observable by a reasonable bystander 
familiar with the Enabling Act’s social and legal context? Quite 
clearly, there were two broad purposes motivating the Act. 
First, as Professor Burbank’s extensive historical research re-
vealed quite convincingly, the procedural-substantive tension 
in the Enabling Act was “intended to allocate power between 
the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress and thus to cir-
cumscribe the delegation of legislative power . . . .”131 Congress 
was to remain responsible for “fundamental normative choices 
of social policy.”132 The second overriding goal of the Enabling 
Act’s adoption was to establish a uniform procedural system in 
the federal courts.133 The desire for uniform and simple rules, 
however, was not born in a vacuum. From the beginning of the 
twentieth century and until the passage of the Enabling Act in 
1934,134 the Act’s framers were cognizant of a desire to move 
 
 128. See id. at 1043–45. 
 129. Id. at 1043–98. 
 130. Id. at 1035. 
 131. Id. at 1025; see also Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1332 (ex-
plaining that one of the goals was “the desire to preserve legislative authority 
over issues extending beyond the courthouse walls”). 
 132. Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1306. 
 133. E.g., id. at 1332 (citing Burbank, supra note 18, at 1023–24, 1065–68). 
 134. See generally Burbank, supra note 18 (laying out, in great detail, the 
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away from the common law pleading system where “[p]arties 
often lost their suits on procedural grounds rather than on the 
merits of their claims.”135 For this reason “[t]he key to the 
movement was the adoption of simple procedural rules that 
would enable litigants to reach the merits of their claims with 
relative ease.”136 The rules would be uniform to ensure that the 
whole federal court system stood in contrast to then-existing 
common law pleading structures. Uniformity would require ef-
fective rules that litigants would be required to follow. Thus, 
sometimes rulemakers would have to promulgate rules to pro-
vide courts with an enforcement mechanism by which to police 
litigants’ compliance with the system’s procedural directives. 
Later in this Article, we criticize the interpretive conclu-
sions that Professor Burbank draws from the historical exami-
nation of the Act.137 Nevertheless, Burbank deserves substan-
tial credit for helping uncover the Enabling Act’s background 
purposes. 
B. APPLYING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORY TO THE 
RULES ENABLING ACT DEBATE 
1. The Relevance of Statutory Interpretation Theory in 
Interpreting the Rules Enabling Act 
As previously noted, there are three broad approaches to 
construction of the Rules Enabling Act: (1) the “mutual exclu-
sivity” or “redundancy” construction, associated primarily with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.; (2) 
the “strict separation” construction advocated by Professors Ely 
and Burbank; and (3) the “incidental-effects” (relaxed separa-
tion) standard adopted by the Court in Burlington Northern 
and Business Guides. However, as we are about to demon-
strate, the strict separation category may be subdivided into 
two versions, those advocated by Professor Ely (what we label 
the “true strict separation” approach) and by Professor Bur-
bank (the “predictable-and-identifiable” interpretive model). By 
applying our underlying contextualist theory of statutory inter-
pretation, we are able to simultaneously establish the superior-
 
history leading up to the Enabling Act’s passage in 1934); Redish & Amuluru, 
supra note 15, at 1308–14 (summarizing the key parts of the Act’s history, fo-
cusing on the desire to move away from rigid, formalistic common law plead-
ing system). 
 135. Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1308–09. 
 136. Id. at 1309. 
 137. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.b. 
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ity of the currently employed incidental-effects interpretive 
model and the significant inadequacies of the alternative mod-
els. The advantage of the incidental-effects model is that it does 
a far better job than the others of recognizing and implement-
ing the purposive DNA of the Rules Enabling Act. It does so be-
cause, when properly rationalized, the test represents a contex-
tualist blend of socio-political history and common sense in 
perceiving and implementing the fundamental legislative pur-
poses inherent in the Act. The alternative models, on the other 
hand, all suffer from one or more of the serious flaws that pla-
gue non-contextualist modes of statutory construction. As a re-
sult, they all end up suffering from the forest-trees pathology 
we described earlier. In short, by ignoring the broad purposive 
context surrounding the Rules Enabling Act, each approach 
ends up seriously threatening achievement of the Act’s purpos-
es. 
2. The Mutual Exclusivity Model 
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. the Court, attempting to adhere 
to and implement the Act’s textual directive, concluded that if a 
rule satisfied the Act’s first requirement that it regulate proce-
dure, it automatically also satisfied the Act’s second require-
ment that it not abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive 
right.138 While this construction has been attacked because it 
renders the second requirement superfluous,139 it may well be 
consistent with the understanding of many of those involved in 
the statute’s enactment. The legislative history reveals that 
many legislators assumed the mutual exclusivity of substance 
and procedure.140 If the two categories were, in fact, mutually 
exclusive, then the very fact that a rule regulated procedure 
would necessarily mean that it did not affect a substantive 
right. Understood in this manner, the second sentence consti-
tutes nothing more than a political exclamation point for the 
first sentence. But the practical absurdity of the assumption of 
mutual exclusivity, even if not recognized by the members of 
Congress themselves, surely should have been perceived by the 
Court in Sibbach (as it explicitly was some seventeen years lat-
er in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electrical).141 
 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 139. See Ely, supra note 12, at 719–20; supra text accompanying notes 15–
16. 
 140. See Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1311. 
 141. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536–40 (1958). 
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At issue in Sibbach was the validity of Rules 35 and 37 un-
der the Enabling Act.142 Rule 35 allowed the court in which the 
action is pending to order a party “to submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a physician.”143 Rule 37, in turn, enu-
merated the various sanctions available for violations of discov-
ery orders.144 The petitioner claimed these rules were “not 
within the mandate of Congress to this court.”145 She admitted 
the rules regulated procedure,146 but argued they nevertheless 
abridged her substantive right to be free from compelled physi-
cal examinations.147 According to the petitioner, the rules vi-
olated the Enabling Act when, as here, they interfered with 
“important” or “substantial” rights.148 
Because the petitioner conceded that the rules in question 
were procedural, the Court rejected her argument that Rules 
35 and 37 violated the Enabling Act. The test, reasoned the 
Court, “must be whether a rule really regulates procedure[]—
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized 
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and re-
dress for disregard or infraction of them.”149 Since the petition-
er had conceded that the rules under attack in Sibbach regu-
lated procedure, the Court reasoned that the rules did not and 
could not violate the Enabling Act.150 Moreover, the Court 
deemed Rules 35 and 37 to be procedural in that they served 
the clear policy motivating the Act: “that the whole field of 
 
 142. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 6 (1941). 
 143. Id. at 8 (quoting Rule 35 as it appeared in 1941). In its current formu-
lation, the rule reads: 
The court where the action is pending may order a party whose men-
tal or physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to 
submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or 
certified examiner. The court has the same authority to order a party 
to produce for examination a person who is in its custody or under its 
legal control.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 
 144. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting the 1941 version of Rule 37(b) 
(“Failure to Comply With Order”)). The current version of Rule 37 is not re-
markably different. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b). 
 145. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9. 
 146. Id. at 11. 
 147. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 9, Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1 (No. 
28).  
 148. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11. 
 149. Id. at 14. 
 150. Id. 
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court procedure be regulated in the interest of speedy, fair and 
exact determination of the truth.”151 
Of some significance to the Court was Congress’s failure to 
block the rules in question before they became effective. The 
Court noted that Rule 35 had been “attacked and defended be-
fore the committees of the two Houses.”152 Tellingly, or so the 
Court thought, “no adverse action was taken by Congress,” 
which “indicate[d], at least, that no transgression of legislative 
policy was found.”153 In Sibbach, we see the first example of the 
Court’s implicit acceptance of the mutual exclusivity approach 
to Enabling Act interpretation.154 As Professor Ely astutely ob-
served, “by [the Court’s] lights, either a Rule was procedural or 
it affected substantive rights.”155 The Court did acknowledge 
the presence of the limiting provision in the Enabling Act, but 
it read that provision merely as a proviso emphasizing the 
enabling portion of the Act.156 The Court thus saw matters of 
substance and procedure as belonging to two mutually exclu-
sive categories.157 
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, did not think much of the 
argument from congressional silence. Paying “due regard to the 
mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions surround-
ing the business of Congress,” he refused “to draw any infe-
rence of tacit approval from non-action by Congress.”158 To do 
so, he said, would be “to appeal to unreality.”159 Unlike the 
Court, Justice Frankfurter would have interpreted the Enabl-
ing Act to prohibit rules that undermine important rights by, 
for example, invading privacy.160 He appeared persuaded by the 
petitioner’s reading of the limiting provision as prohibiting the 
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 152. Id. at 15. 
 153. Id. at 16. 
 154. See Redish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1328. 
 155. Ely, supra note 12, at 719. 
 156. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10 (concluding that the Enabling Act “was 
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rules from interfering with important, substantial rights.161 
Frankfurter did not, however, articulate which rights should be 
deemed important or substantial. 
A Court using a broader contextualist analysis of the 
Enabling Act would have rejected the Sibbach test. Once the 
interpreting Court grasped that members of Congress may well 
have incorrectly proceeded on the fallacy of mutual exclusivity, 
the Court’s role as implementer would have dictated the need 
for some form of interpretive recalculation. Apparently Con-
gress proceeded on the incorrect assumption that it could 
achieve its statutory goals of allowing the Court to regulate 
procedure, while simultaneously retaining for itself exclusive 
control over matters of substance, simply by separating the 
two. A contextualist interpreter, once recognizing the fallacy 
inherent in the methodology chosen to achieve underlying legis-
lative goals, would seek to construe the text in the manner that 
most effectively achieves those goals. In combining a broad his-
torical understanding of legislative goals, Posnerian imagina-
tive reconstruction, and a fair amount of common sense,162 the 
Court should have asked itself how the competing legislative 
goals of the production of a uniform system of procedural jus-
tice on the one hand, and the preservation of substantive policy 
making by accountable legislative bodies on the other, could be 
achieved. A contextualist interpretive model, then, would have 
sought to implement the fundamental underlying purposes of 
the Act, rather than the narrow (mis)understandings of the leg-
islators who enacted it. Such an interpretive recalculation, of 
course, would not have been permitted if the Enabling Act con-
tained no textual ambiguities. Precisely because of the ambigu-
ities, however, a recalculation in light of the objectively unders-
tood purposes motivating the Act is quite appropriate. 
3. The True Strict Separation Model 
In a well-known article, John Hart Ely effectively pointed 
out the fallacies of the mutual exclusivity approach.163 In its 
place, he advocated a construction that meticulously adheres to 
the letter of the Act. The Enabling Act, he argued, “begins with 
a checklist approach—anything that relates to process, writs, 
pleadings, motions, or to practice and procedure generally, is 
 
 161. See id. at 17–18. 
 162. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Ely, supra note 12, at 724–33. 
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authorized; anything else is not.”164 The Sibbach Court stopped 
at that point, interpreting the whole “Act as a checklist only.”165 
Ely disagreed. He saw in the limiting provision of the Act an 
independent condition that rulemakers had to satisfy. If a rule 
is on the checklist, the inquiry is not over, at least not for Ely, 
because the rule also cannot affect litigants’ substantive 
rights.166 This second condition is what Ely has termed the “en-
clave” limitation.167 
According to Ely, the appropriate test for deciding whether 
a rule violates the Enabling Act would inquire “whether the 
state provision [in conflict with the federal rules] embodies a 
substantive policy or represents only a procedural disagree-
ment with the federal rulemakers respecting the fairest and 
most efficient way of conducting litigation.”168 Ely described 
what he saw as the difference between substance and proce-
dure as follows: A “procedural rule is . . . one designed to make 
the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the 
resolution of disputes.”169 A substantive right, on the other 
hand, is “a right granted for one or more nonprocedural rea-
sons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the 
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.”170 
Acknowledging, as he had to, the existence of rules which 
may simultaneously impact both procedural and substantive 
concerns,171 Ely explained the steps courts should take in ad-
judging the validity of such rules under the Enabling Act.172 
Take a hypothetical federal rule establishing a statute of limi-
tations, which is supported by a desire to keep dockets smaller 
(procedural) and to put at ease the minds of potential litigants 
after the passage of time (substantive).173 The rule easily 
passes the statutory checklist, since at least in some sense it 
 
 164. Id. at 718. 
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deals with procedure. But the statutory enclave would keep 
such a rule out.174 
4. Professor Burbank’s Predictable-and-Identifiable Model 
The approach adopted in Sibbach illustrates the inadequa-
cies of a four-corners construction that accepts one of the three 
conceivable interpretations of the procedural-substantive ten-
sion without adequately examining the Act’s background pur-
poses and their relevance to textual interpretation. Professor 
Ely’s approach suffers from a similar flaw. In this section, we 
turn to Professor Burbank’s suggested interpretation of the sta-
tutory tension. His approach fits within the intentionalist ru-
bric because of his dispositive reliance on legislative history. In 
this section we describe Burbank’s theory and detail the serious 
shortcomings of his interpretive approach. 
Before proceeding to a detailed exploration of Professor 
Burbank’s approach, it is first necessary to emphasize the high 
practical stakes. Burbank’s approach would construe the 
Enabling Act to prohibit any rule that has a predictable and 
identifiable impact on substantive rights.175 If logically ap-
plied,176 this standard would have a dramatically negative im-
pact on the current version of the rules. More importantly, it 
would effectively deprive the rulemakers of any meaningful 
power to back up their procedural directives, thereby depriving 
the rules of much of their force. 
a. Deriving a Test from Legislative History 
Professor Burbank’s interpretation of the procedural-
substantive statutory tension largely builds on the extensive 
historical research he presented in a seminal article on the ori-
gins of the Enabling Act.177 Because the 1934 Act was the final 
product of many years of political efforts in Congress to author-
ize creation of a uniform system of federal procedure, Burbank 
 
 174. Id. at 726–27 (suggesting that in a conflict between federal and state 
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 175. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1160 (“The history suggests, at the 
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believes it both necessary and appropriate, in deciphering legis-
lative intent, to draw on historical documents relevant to those 
earlier efforts.178 Of the various pre-1934 legislative documents, 
he chooses to focus primarily on one, a 1926 report by the Se-
nate Judiciary Committee,179 because he believes it offers “the 
most detailed and informative of all the legislative materials 
concerning the bill that became the Act.”180 Of particular signi-
ficance to the procedural-substantive tension, he concludes, is 
the fact that the report sets out the Committee’s answer to 
those opposing the bill on the grounds that it would enable the 
Court to promulgate rules affecting substantive rights.181 
The Committee faced the following charge from the opposi-
tion: “[T]he bill . . . attempts to vest in the Supreme Court the 
power to make rules covering limitations of actions, provisional 
remedies, such as orders of arrest and attachment, and the se-
lection or qualification of jurors.”182 The Committee soundly re-
jected the notion that the proposed legislation vested in the 
Court rulemaking authority over such matters.183 Professor 
Burbank, in turn, gleans a common element from the report’s 
three examples of what lies beyond the rulemaking power. He 
explains: 
Most of the matters discussed and classified as substantive in the 
1926 Senate Report involve, at their core, either potential effects on 
“rights” recognized by the “substantive law” that are predictable and 
identifiable, or the creation of remedial rights that predictably and 
identifiably affect personal liberty or the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty.184 
Burbank then discusses exactly what he means by the 
phrase “predictable and identifiable.” Take the first example 
from the 1926 report, the choice of a limitations period that ap-
plies in a particular case. Burbank acknowledges, as he must, 
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that the choice of one limitations period over another does not 
obviously translate into a predictable effect on substantive 
rights.185 A plaintiff who brings a suit one year after the cause 
of action has arisen would presumably be indifferent between 
two and three-year statutes of limitations. Nevertheless, Bur-
bank is able to conclude that “experience with a variety of time 
periods tells us that some impact is assured, and it is identifia-
ble.”186 What he probably means is that instead of looking at 
the impact of limitations laws at the time a cause of action 
arises, we should determine identifiability at the time a statute 
of limitation defense is asserted in the course of the litiga-
tion.187 Then, a litigant who has waited two and a half years to 
file a lawsuit will very much care whether the applicable limi-
tations is two, rather than three years. The predictable and 
identifiable effect in Professor Burbank’s test appears to be a 
flexible concept. “The uncertainty [that] arises from the differ-
ences in ability of those whose substantive law rights are at 
stake to protect themselves”188 is not fatal, and the effect may 
be predictable and identifiable even in light of that uncertainty. 
The second example in the 1926 report referred to “provi-
sional remedies, such as orders of arrest and attachment.”189 
The choice between two rules that define differently the cases 
where an order of attachment may issue will impact someone’s 
“use or enjoyment of property in much the same way as rules of 
substantive law.”190 Accordingly, under Burbank’s formulation, 
the choice of a rule as to when an order of attachment may is-
sue affects substantive rights predictably and identifiably. 
The final example, “the selection or qualification of ju-
rors,”191 gives rise to a somewhat trickier problem, but it never-
theless demonstrates exactly how flexible the phrase “predicta-
ble and identifiable” really is. After all, how does the selection 
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and qualification of jurors affect a constitutional right to jury 
trial?192 It seems, however, that despite the test’s very lan-
guage, something less than a truly predictable and identifiable 
impact may be required under Burbank’s test when a substan-
tive right is of constitutional origin. The Committee, he argues, 
“may have intended to suggest that when the interest in ques-
tion finds its source in the Constitution, the confidence with 
which a prediction and identification of impact must be made 
before choice is allocated to Congress under the Act should be 
reduced.”193 
Though the success of predicting and identifying the im-
pact on substantive rights varies among the three examples, 
Professor Burbank remains adamant that the procedural-
substantive tension is to be resolved by resort to the predicta-
ble-and-identifiable test. To him, it is simply a matter of what 
the controlling legislative history dictates. At no point does he 
consider how his interpretation comports with statutory text. 
Nor does he adequately consider whether his standard makes 
sense in light of the broad statutory purposes and policies un-
doubtedly underlying the legislation ultimately enacted in 
1934. In the narrowest intentionalist mode, he gives dispositive 
effect to specific statements contained in legislative history: 
“[t]he pre-1934 history suggests an intent to exclude rulemak-
ing by the Supreme Court, and to require that any prospective 
federal lawmaking be done by Congress, where the choice 
among legal prescriptions would have a predictable and identi-
fiable effect on such rights.”194 
One can, of course, easily subject Burbank’s proposed in-
terpretive standard to all of the well-established criticisms tra-
ditionally hurled at heavy reliance on legislative history.195 
However, for reasons we are about to explore, Burbank’s rigid 
reliance on legislative history is additionally subject to a 
unique line of even more serious criticism. 
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b. Burbank’s Mistakes in Interpreting the Rules Enabling Act 
 i. The 1926 Committee Report and the 1934 Congress 
The foundation for Burbank’s predictable-and-identifiable 
formulation, as explained above, lies exclusively in a 1926 Se-
nate Judiciary Committee report, issued in support of an earli-
er proposed version of the Act that ultimately failed eight years 
prior to the Act’s eventual adoption.196 The committee report 
was published during the sixty-ninth Congress.197 Yet it was 
the seventy-third Congress that eventually passed the 1934 
Rules Enabling Act.198 Why, one might reasonably ask, is a re-
port separated from the enacting Congress by four intervening 
Congresses to be deemed dispositive in interpreting a statute 
enacted eight years later? One might also inquire what the leg-
islative history from the 1934 Congress, the one that actually 
passed the Enabling Act, says on the subject. Professor Bur-
bank tells us that the legislative history attributable to the 
1934 bill, introduced at the behest of Attorney General Cum-
mings, is silent regarding the allocation of powers between 
Congress and the Court.199 In light of such silence, one should 
question whether it is appropriate to impute the views of the 
1926 Congress to the 1934 legislators. Professor Burbank, 
though, rejects this concern for several reasons200—none of 
which is persuasive in the slightest. 
One argument to which he points in support of his heavy 
reliance on the 1926 report relies on the “speed with which the 
Attorney General’s bill was considered and enacted” in 1934.201 
Since the bill was introduced and passed in 1934 with astonish-
ing speed, the argument proceeds, we cannot reasonably expect 
the 1934 Congress to have elaborated upon its views of the Act 
with the same level of detail supplied in the 1926 Report.202 Far 
from providing support for Burbank’s position, however, this 
argument actually seems to cut directly against Burbank’s de-
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cision to rely so heavily on the 1926 report. The speed with 
which the Enabling Act received approval suggests that a care-
ful consideration of the bill, let alone awareness and careful 
study by the 1934 Congress of the 1926 Report, was all but in-
conceivable. It does not make sense, then, to decipher the 
meaning of the Enabling Act passed by the 1934 Congress 
through the interpretive prism of the 1926 report, for the sim-
ple reason that it is highly unlikely—or, at the very least, un-
proven—that very many of the members of Congress in 1934 
were even familiar with the 1926 Report. And surely the bur-
den of proof rests squarely on Professor Burbank’s shoulders 
when an eight-year-old report is at issue. 
Burbank’s second justification for placing such inordinate 
reliance on the 1926 Senate Report is no more compelling. 
“Where the reports and debate preceding [the] passage of legis-
lation by Congress have been similarly uninformative,” he ar-
gues, “the Court has considered more detailed materials from 
prior sessions of Congress.”203 Since the Court has engaged in 
this practice in other areas, he reasons, it is equally appropri-
ate to employ the approach in interpreting the Rules Enabling 
Act.204 To support his use of such outdated legislative mate-
rials, Burbank points to three instances where the Court, he 
claims, has done just that.205 It is worthwhile to examine the 
three examples closely because they illustrate just how thinly 
Burbank has to stretch the Court’s precedent in this area to 
justify his virtually exclusive reliance on an eight-year-old Se-
nate Report in construing the intent of Congress four terms 
later. Examination of the three examples demonstrates that, 
even apart from the more traditional arguments cautioning 
against reliance on legislative history in any context, the use of 
past congressional materials to which absolutely no subsequent 
reference was made is especially suspect. 
First, Burbank relies on the Court’s use of prior legislative 
history “with respect to [statutory] language that ‘crystallized’ 
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at an earlier time and appeared in the bill when enacted.”206 He 
cites in support of this proposition a footnote in T.W.A., Inc. v. 
Civil Aeronautics Board.207 In relevant part, the footnote states 
the following: “This history is relevant to our problem, for 
though it relates to the 1937 bill which was not passed, the 
‘make effective’ clause crystallized at that time and appeared in 
the 1938 bill which was enacted.”208 To rely on T.W.A., Burbank 
must argue that reliance on eight-year-old legislative history is 
permissible because the Court has, on one occasion, relied upon 
one-year-old history. But surely he must recognize the obvious 
difference between reliance on legislative history generated 
four Congresses prior, on the one hand, and reliance on legisla-
tive history from a previous session of the same Congress, on 
the other. In T.W.A., the Court at least was dealing with the 
same set of legislators—something that cannot be said of re-
liance on the 1926 Senate Report as a means of interpreting the 
1934 Enabling Act. 
Second, Burbank argues the Court has relied on prior leg-
islative history “where ‘the essence of the legislation remained 
constant.’”209 As support, he cites Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co.,210 which states: 
In three sets of hearings over the course of four years, proponents and 
opponents of the legislation debated its impact and relationship with 
prior law. . . . Although the final version of the statute reflects some 
minor changes from earlier drafts, the essence of the legislation re-
mained constant. References were made in the later hearings to tes-
timony in the earlier ones. Accordingly, we regard each set of hear-
ings as relevant to a full understanding of the final legislative 
product.211 
The crux of the Court’s reliance on legislative history from 
previous Congresses is explained by “[r]eferences . . . made in 
the later hearings to testimony in the earlier ones.”212 But no 
such reference was made to connect the 1934 passage of the 
Enabling Act with the 1926 Report.213 Indeed, Burbank himself 
quite explicitly establishes the contrary: earlier “considered ex-
plications of the [1934] bill’s provisions . . . were not specifically 
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referred to in the scanty materials produced in 1934.”214 He at-
tempts to preempt this objection by asserting, “[a]lthough the 
prior legislative hearing and reports on the Cummins bill were 
not mentioned in the 1934 legislative material, the fact that the 
ABA and others had recommended the provisions of the bill ‘for 
a good many years’ was.”215 But what difference does that fact 
make? Burbank does not establish the 1934 Congress’s aware-
ness of the ABA’s efforts; he says not a word to address wheth-
er the ABA’s campaign made the 1934 Congress aware of the 
substance of the 1926 report. 
Finally, Burbank attempts to justify his reliance on prior 
legislative history “where ‘the operative language of the origi-
nal bill was substantially carried forward into the Act.’”216 For 
this proposition, he cites the following language from United 
States v. Enmons: 
The remarks with respect to that bill . . . are wholly relevant to an 
understanding of the Hobbs Act, since the operative language of the 
original bill was substantially carried forward into the Act. The con-
gressional debates on the Hobbs Act in the 79th Congress repeatedly 
referred to the legislative history of the original bill. . . . Surely an in-
terpretation placed by the sponsor of a bill on the very language sub-
sequently enacted by Congress cannot be dismissed out of hand, as 
the dissent would have it, simply because the interpretation was giv-
en two years earlier.217 
Reliance on Enmons suffers from the same problem identi-
fied in the previous example: the enacting Congress there ex-
plicitly referred to prior legislative history,218 a fact not true of 
the Congress that enacted the 1934 Enabling Act. But the prob-
lems with Burbank’s reliance on Emmons go far deeper than 
this. Notice the essence of the Court’s reasoning: the bill spon-
sor’s earlier remarks are relevant in interpreting the bill. Un-
like the situation in Enmons, the 1934 bill received a new spon-
sor—Senator Ashurst.219 Senator Ashurst, as Burbank tells us, 
“had voted with the majority to report the Cummins [1924] bill 
adversely in 1928.”220 Not only was the 1926 Report authored 
by someone other than the 1934 bill’s sponsor, but the sponsor 
of the 1934 bill had actually voted against the bill’s earlier ver-
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sion. It makes no sense to conclude (at least absent far stronger 
supporting evidence) that the Senator who introduced the 1934 
bill intended to give the bill an interpretation that the very 
same Senator had rejected only six years earlier. 
The three Supreme Court decisions Professor Burbank 
cites, then, do not actually warrant the position he seeks to 
support: the virtually exclusive reliance on eight-year-old legis-
lative history from a much earlier Congress by a Congress that 
made no reference to that history. But even if the Court’s doc-
trine did support Burbank’s obviously tortured approach, sev-
eral additional reasons would counsel against its use. As we 
have previously shown, exclusive reliance on any form of legis-
lative history in statutory interpretation is highly dubious.221 A 
fortiori, reliance on one statement in a prior Congress’s legisla-
tive report of which most enacting legislators may well have 
been totally unaware amounts to the height of folly. 
Aside from stretching rather thinly three Supreme Court 
cases, Burbank also supports his reliance on the 1926 Senate 
Report by noting that nothing happened between 1926 and 
1934 “to suggest that in using the identical language Congress 
sought to achieve different purposes, or to rob some of that lan-
guage of its meaning.”222 This argument, however, blatantly ig-
nores four congressional elections—in 1926, 1928, 1930, and 
1932. This is especially significant in light of Burbank’s inabili-
ty to establish the 1934 Congress’s awareness of—much less re-
liance upon—the 1926 Senate Report. 
Burbank anticipates the objection by arguing that congres-
sional preferences on the issue could not have changed because 
“for some of [the period between 1926 and 1934] the campaign 
for passage of the uniform federal procedure bill was actively 
pressed in Congress, and the bill’s legislative sponsors in 1934 
were both well acquainted with that campaign.”223 At most, all 
this argument proves is that the goal of procedural uniformity 
remained constant. But that says nothing of the allocation of 
powers between Congress and the Court. This is especially im-
portant because the predictable-and-identifiable test neither 
follows obviously from the text of the 1926 Report224 nor is it by 
any means obvious as a matter of legislative policy.225 There-
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fore, in light of the fact that the predictable-and-identifiable al-
location formula was at best peripheral to the 1926 Report, it is 
particularly unconvincing to argue the formula applicable in 
1934. 
 ii. The Language of the 1926 Report and the Predictable-
and-Identifiable Test 
On structural, process-based grounds, Professor Burbank’s 
reliance on the 1926 report is suspect at best, for reasons we 
have just explained. But even if one were to suspend disbelief 
and grant the appropriateness of reliance on the 1926 report, 
there remains an additional problem with his use of legislative 
history. He fails to recognize that the predictable-and-
identifiable test was at most peripheral to the report on which 
he relies and does not flow from it with any reasonable degree 
of certainty, even if one assumes the report’s relevance to the 
1934 Act. When the dust settles, then, we can see that Bur-
bank’s predictable-and-identifiable test derives exclusively 
from one Senate Committee Report issued four Congresses 
prior to passage of the Act, and, most critically, that report does 
not actually support the test in any event. 
Above all other statements in the 1926 Report, Burbank 
selects the following language to support his proposed test: 
Limitations of time for the commencement of actions and the issuance 
of writs of attachment or of arrest, or the determination of what shall 
constitute the qualification of a juror, are matters involving substan-
tive legal and remedial rights affected by the considerations of public 
policy. Their regulations are clearly solely within the legislative pow-
er.226 
The report also expressed Congress’s hope that in promul-
gating rules the Court would resolve any doubts against finding 
an attempt on Congress’s part to delegate “what is in reality a 
legislative function.”227 On the basis of these statements in the 
1926 report, Burbank formulates the predictable-and-
identifiable test.228 He then extends the test to add preclusion 
law to the list of prohibited items.229 The basic argument can be 
 
 226. S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 9 (1926). 
 227. Id. at 11. 
 228. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1128 (“Most of the matters discussed 
and classified as substantive in the 1926 Senate Report involve, at their core, 
either potential effects on ‘rights’ recognized by the ‘substantive law’ that are 
predictable and identifiable, or the creation of remedial rights that predictably 
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summarized in the following manner: the 1926 Report, by men-
tioning “[l]imitations of time for the commencement of ac-
tions,”230 intended to prohibit the rules from dealing with any 
instances of preclusion.231 
That such a sweeping argument goes too far can be seen by 
comparing two hypothetical rules. Suppose Rule A allows fed-
eral district courts to dismiss with prejudice (aiming to bar the 
claim under res judicata laws)232 as a way of discouraging dis-
covery abuse.233 Rule B, on the other hand, sets forth nothing 
more nor less than a federal law of res judicata, perhaps by re-
defining the privity element.234 Unlike Rule A, which affects 
substantive rights solely as a means of facilitating enforcement 
of the primary procedural directive, Rule B’s sole purpose is to 
alter rights beyond the four walls of the courthouse. In clearly 
prohibiting Rule B, the 1926 Report does not necessarily prec-
lude Rule A. When the Report states that a Federal Rule of Civ-
il Procedure cannot set forth a rule of preclusion, we do not 
know whether the Report intends to prohibit only rules that 
deal exclusively with preclusion apart from its impact on pro-
cedure or also rules that deal with preclusion as a means by 
which a procedural goal can be achieved. Moreover, the source 
of the examples in the Report offers good reasons to conclude 
the drafters were concerned with rules that deal solely with the 
substantive law of preclusion. The source of the concern 
evinced in the report was the New York Code, which had at-
tempted to set forth “provisions as to substantive law.”235 The 
New York statutory provisions had set out unambiguous subs-
tantive laws without attempting thereby to further procedural 
 
 230. S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 9. 
 231. But see infra Part II.B.4.c for an illustration that the predictable-and-
identifiable test, as applied by Burbank, seems quite flexible in its treatment 
of preclusion-like provisions in the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 232. For a discussion of a hornbook approach to res judicata, which in-
cludes the “on the merits” or “with prejudice” requirement, see RICHARD L. 
MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1140–
45 (3d ed. 2000). 
 233. Rule 37, for example, contains a similar sanction for discovery viola-
tions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b), (d). 
 234. The same parties or persons in privity with the parties have to be liti-
gants in both actions to trigger res judicata laws. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 94 (1980). One example of a change in the privity requirement is dis-
pensing with it completely. In other words, the only litigants bound by res ju-
dicata will be the actual parties in the first action. Admittedly, it might not be 
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 235. S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 10 (1926). 
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goals.236 This speaks to hypothetical Rule B, but most certainly 
not to hypothetical Rule A. 
Finally, the Report contains at least one indication that 
procedurally motivated rules such as hypothetical Rule A were 
to be deemed permissible. According to the Report, “it was also 
held that [the phrase] ‘modes of process’ related only to the pro-
cedure by which the court could enforce its process.”237 If a 
court can dismiss a claim with prejudice for failure to follow 
some other rule, it is conceivably exercising a methodology 
(dismissal with prejudice) by which it is enforcing its process 
(some other procedural rule or rules violated by a litigant). 
Thus, the 1926 Report, in at least one place, actually under-
mines Burbank’s reading that categorically places issues of 
preclusion beyond the reach of the rules. 
 iii. Fallacious Reliance on the 1988 Amendment of the 
Rules Enabling Act 
Professor Burbank also looks to the 1988 revision of the 
Enabling Act for further support of his suggested predictable-
and-identifiable standard of interpretation. Reliance on the 
1988 reenactment, however, is dubious to say the least. In 
1987, one year prior, the Supreme Court had decided Burling-
ton Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, in which it construed the 
procedural-substantive tension as set out in the original ver-
sion of the Act to allow a rule to impact substantive rights as 
long as the effect is merely incidental to a broader procedural 
purpose—a standard drastically different from Burbank’s pre-
dictable-and-identifiable formulation.238 
The Enabling Act’s 1988 amendment left the relevant sta-
tutory language virtually untouched.239 However, Burbank 
points to a suggestion in the 1988 legislative history that courts 
“guard against the assumption that similar statutory language 
should be given the same meaning by the courts.”240 But the 
1988 history explicitly states, “[t]he purpose of this title [deal-
ing with the procedural-substantive tension in the Enabling 
Act] is to modernize the current statutory provisions relating to 
the Federal judiciary’s role in promulgating amendments to the 
Rules of Evidence and various rules of procedure applicable to 
 
 236. See id. (describing how “the matter is all of substantive character”). 
 237. Id. at 9. 
 238. See 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
 239. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 240. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1035. 
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the Federal courts.”241 If the 1988 Congress truly intended to 
depart from the existing Supreme Court construction of the 
Act, including the incidental-effects test set out only one year 
prior to the 1988 amendment, use of the word “modernize” 
would have been a strange way to accomplish so radical a 
change. Indeed, for Congress to employ the exact same statuto-
ry language and yet intend an unstated alteration of that lan-
guage would come dangerously close to impermissible legisla-
tive deception—Congress, in other words, could be deceiving 
the electorate into thinking nothing has changed, but intending 
a change all along.242 
It would surely be inappropriate for Congress to retain the 
previously construed statutory language yet simultaneously in-
tend to alter its established construction. According to a well-
accepted canon of construction, “[w]ords and phrases which 
have received judicial construction before enactment are to be 
understood according to that construction.”243 While the canon 
speaks to enactment, not amendment, the same logic would 
seem to apply equally in both contexts. Underpinning the canon 
is a commonsense observation that drafters familiar with how 
the courts have construed a particular word or phrase would 
draft the statute in light of that interpretation either by adopt-
ing or rejecting the judicial construction.244 The point is even 
stronger in the context of the 1988 revision because there Con-
gress affirmatively chose to reenact virtually the same words 
that the Court had construed only one year earlier in Burling-
ton Northern.245 
If the canon is assumed to apply in the context of an 
amendment, then the Court’s 1987 decision in Burlington 
Northern should have substantial relevance to post-1988 inter-
 
 241. H.R. REP. No. 100-89, at 26 (1988). 
 242. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative De-
ception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Po-
litical Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2006); cf. 
Dennis Murashko, Comment, Accountability and Constitutional Federalism: 
Reconsidering Federal Conditional Spending Programs in Light of Democratic 
Political Theory, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 931, 936–42 (2007) (describing congres-
sional accountability concerns in the context of the conditional spending doc-
trine). 
 243. Llewellyn, supra note 55, at 403. 
 244. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381, 384–85 (1954) (con-
struing reenacted statutory language in light of judicial interpretations that 
occurred between the original promulgation and the reenactment). 
 245. Compare Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec. 401, 102 Stat. 
4648, 4649 (1988), with Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
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pretations of the Enabling Act. That Court interpreted the Act 
to permit effects on substantive rights that are merely inciden-
tal to a broader procedural purpose.246 Logically, then, by the 
canon’s operation, the post-1988 interpretation of the Act must 
not deviate markedly from the Burlington Northern interpreta-
tion. To be sure, the canon would yield to a clear directive in 
the statute (perhaps in a definition section) that a word or 
phrase is to receive a different meaning from that in the prior 
version.247 However, Congress supplied no such indication in 
the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act; in fact, as we have 
already emphasized, the language is largely unchanged.248 In-
deed, the Senate’s section-by-section commentary on the pro-
posed language of the Enabling Act arguably provides a basis 
on which to believe the Senate in 1988 perceived the amended 
Act as accepting the Burlington Northern interpretation.249 The 
amended limiting provision, according to the Senate, “carries 
forward the scope of current law.”250 The Senate considered the 
same to be true for the amended enabling provision.251 The 
phrase “scope of” surely suggests the Senate understood not on-
ly that the amended Enabling Act would mirror the language of 
the 1934 Act, but also that the Court’s interpretive doctrine 
would continue to apply. Thus, the legislative history of the 
1988 revisions does not seem to help Professor Burbank as 
much as he thinks it does. 
c. Applying the Predictable-and-Identifiable Standard to 
Individual Rules 
Professor Burbank’s extensive scholarship on the Rules 
Enabling Act provides illustrations of how his test is to apply to 
several current rules. All of these rules either expressly contain 
or necessarily imply preclusive directives.252 We examine three 
of them below: Rules 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims)253 as 
well as 37(b) and (d) (discovery sanctions).254 Our analysis 
 
 246. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5; Llewellyn, supra note 55, at 
403. 
 247. Llewellyn, supra note 55, at 403. 
 248. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1034. 
 250. Id. (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S16,284-01 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hef-
lin)). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. 
 253. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
 254. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b), (d). 
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clearly demonstrates that Burbank’s interpretive approach, 
when properly applied, often leads to wholly untenable results. 
 i. Rule 13 
Rule 13(a), which certain commentators have described as 
a res judicata-like provision,255 provides: 
A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the time 
of service—the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the opposing party’s claim; and (B) does not require adding another 
party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.256 
On its face, the rule unambiguously sets out a circums-
tance where, solely by its operation, litigants are precluded 
from raising a claim in future litigation. If a defendant has a 
potential counterclaim arising out the same transaction or oc-
currence as the plaintiff ’s claim, she must raise the counter-
claim in the original lawsuit or be barred from bringing it in a 
separate proceeding. 
There would appear to be little doubt that, on its face, Rule 
13(a) includes a preclusion element, barring subsequent suits 
that are part of the unbrought counterclaims. After all, there 
must be some way to distinguish “compulsory” counterclaims 
provided for in Rule 13(a)257 from the “permissive” variety pro-
vided for in Rule 13(b).258 Otherwise, there of course would 
have been no reason for this distinction in the first place. Since 
there is no distinction between the two—at least in a non-
jurisdictional sense—when the defendant actually files a coun-
terclaim, the difference must occur when the defendant fails to 
file the counterclaim. If one were to ask what the difference be-
tween the “must” of Rule 13(a) and the “may” of Rule 13(b) is, 
the inevitable response would be that use of the word “must,” 
unlike use of the word “may,” necessarily implies an “or else” 
for failure to take the directed action.259 In other words, there 
will be some negative consequence, the fear of which is de-
 
 255. See, e.g., MARCUS ET AL., supra note 232 (“Rule 13(a) [which governs 
compulsory counterclaims] is a sort of rule-mandated res judicata. It has the 
effect of barring a party from recovering on a claim [in certain circums-
tances] . . . .”). 
 256. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). 
 257. Id. 
 258. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) (“A pleading may state as a counterclaim against 
an opposing party any claim that is not compulsory.”). 
 259. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 819 (Frederick C. 
Mish et al. eds., 11th ed. 2003). 
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signed to induce (or coerce) compliance.260 Therefore, in the ab-
sence of any other explicit directive of negative consequence, 
the use of the word “must” in Rule 13(a) would be rendered in-
coherent unless implicit in its use is the implication that the 
failure to bring the counterclaim in the first litigation would 
preclude suit on that claim in the future. 
The inexorably preclusive consequence of failure to comply 
with the directive of Rule 13(a) puts Burbank in a position of 
having to make a difficult choice: he has to either reject the 
rule as a violation of his predictable-and-identifiable Enabling 
Act construction or somehow construe the rule to exclude a 
preclusive element—a conclusion that, for reasons just ex-
plained, strains credulity. Nevertheless, Burbank opts for the 
latter. To him, “Rule 13(a) .  .  .  is a product of history and, at 
most, a vehicle of legal support for federal common law.”261 
Arguing against a construction of Rule 13(a) as a res judi-
cata-like provision, Burbank writes: “Aside from the fact that it 
governs procedure in the rendering court, which lacks the pow-
er finally to determine the preclusive effects of its judgments, 
Rule 13(a) does not in so many words and could not validly pro-
vide a rule of preclusion.”262 In effect, Burbank argues that 
Rule 13(a) does not contain a preclusive element, because it 
cannot do so—an inference that by no means follows logically. 
Indeed, such reasoning is entirely circular and question-
begging. The very issue to be resolved, namely the legitimacy 
under the Rules Enabling Act of a rule having a preclusive im-
pact, Burbank assumes away. In any event, whether it may do 
so or not, we have already shown that, absent an inherent prec-
lusion mechanism, Rule 13(a) makes no sense: absent a preclu-
sive impact for a defendant’s failure to comply, a mandatory di-
rective would have no consequences for failure to comply, 
effectively rendering it a permissive directive, in direct contra-
diction of its express terms and rendering Rule 13(b)’s provision 
for permissive counterclaims wholly (and incoherently) redun-
dant.263 
 
 260. See id. 
 261. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and 
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Burbank, we should note, does not completely deny a prec-
lusive effect flowing from Rule 13(a).264 However, he somehow 
manages to divorce this inexorable, preclusive impact from the 
text of the rule itself. He argues that, at most, Rule 13(a) may 
give rise to a federal common law rule precluding the filing in 
subsequent proceedings of what had been a compulsory coun-
terclaim in the first proceeding.265 But even if true, this does 
not alter the fact that Rule 13(a) operates as a necessary causal 
element in achieving that preclusive impact, an impact Bur-
bank denies it can have under his construction of the Enabling 
Act.266 Absent the unambiguously compulsory directive embo-
died in the provision, no such common law rule would ever ex-
ist in the first place.267 It is solely because of Rule 13(a)’s com-
pulsion that preclusion in other courts results, whether or not 
it occurs directly or is laundered through some mythical com-
mon law rule.268 It is difficult to understand how Burbank be-
lieves he is able to divorce Rule 13(a) from its inherent, preclu-
sive impact, merely by resort to some sleight-of-hand creation 
of an intermediate common law rule. 
Finally, Burbank argues that Rule 13(a) merely expresses 
the rulemakers’ policy preference in favor of compulsory coun-
terclaims.269 It is by means of this preference that we are led to 
federal common law, which supposedly acts as an enforcement 
mechanism. He reasons: 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can . . . serve as sources of federal 
common law, not only by leaving interstices to be filled but also by 
expressing policies that are pertinent in areas not covered by the 
Rules. Even when legal regulation in a certain area is forbidden to the 
Rules, the policies underlying valid Rules may help to shape valid 
federal common law.270 
Was Rule 13(a) merely a statement of rulemakers’ policy 
preferences, reminiscent of a statutory preamble? The Advisory 
Committee notes from 1937—the time of the original rule’s 
promulgation—point to the contrary.271 The Committee wrote: 
 
 264. See Burbank, supra note 261, at 774–75. 
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“If the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of 
a counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the 
counterclaim is barred.”272 The language clearly manifests the 
Committee’s intent to impose a mandatory consequence rather 
than merely express a policy preference to that effect. To be 
sure, if the rule as written is inconsistent with some higher le-
gal authority—for example, the Rules Enabling Act or the Con-
stitution—it must be invalidated. But that fact cannot logically 
alter the rule’s unambiguous meaning. 
The question then becomes whether Rule 13(a), construed 
as a rule of preclusion, is legally invalid for some reason. That 
reason is not to be found in the United States Constitution. 
Surely, nothing prevents Congress from allowing one federal 
court to impose a preclusive impact in another federal court. 
Similarly, the Supremacy Clause273 would seem to enable Con-
gress to bind subsequent state court actions.274 The only con-
ceivable basis for Burbank’s insistence that a federal rule may 
not impose a preclusive effect is his own circular understanding 
of the Rules Enabling Act’s scope. But such an analysis 
amounts to hopeless question-begging: it is the very fact that 
Rule 13(a) has so unambiguously and uncontroversially im-
posed a preclusive impact beyond the confines of the initial ac-
tion that casts Burbank’s construction into such serious doubt 
in the first place.275 
In short, Burbank either has to reach the highly dubious 
conclusion that Rule 13(a) is invalid under the Enabling Act 
because it impermissibly creates a rule of preclusion, or aban-
don his predictable-and-identifiable test. That he purports to do 
neither demonstrates the incoherence and inadequacy of his 
approach to Enabling Act interpretation. 
 ii. Rule 37 
Equally troublesome under Professor Burbank’s predicta-
ble-and-identifiable standard is Rule 37, which authorizes the 
district court to impose sanctions, including the power to dis-
miss a complaint, award a default judgment, or, in most cases, 
hold a litigant in contempt.276 Rule 37(b)(2) addresses sanctions 
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for litigants’ failure to comply with a discovery order.277 Among 
the possible sanctions are: 
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designat-
ed facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the pre-
vailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from sup-
porting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from 
introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in 
whole or in party; (iv) staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) 
rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) 
treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an 
order to submit to a physical or mental examination.278 
Rule 37(d), in turn, allows the court in which the action is 
pending to apply these sanctions against a party who has failed 
to appear at her own deposition, to answer or object to interro-
gatories, or to answer or object to a request for document pro-
duction.279 To summarize, Rule 37 uses the potential club of 
substantive disposition in order to achieve a procedural goal—
namely, attaining compliance with discovery orders and proce-
dures as a means of facilitating performance of the truth-
finding function. Courts have, on occasion, invoked this pow-
er.280 
Does Rule 37, with its obvious substantive components, vi-
olate the Enabling Act because it has the “predictable-and-
identifiable” effect on substantive rights that, according to Bur-
bank’s construction of the Enabling Act, is impermissible? Pro-
fessor Burbank’s answer is “no” because resort to the substan-
tive aspect of the rule is discretionary with the trial judge.281 
 
denied authority to hold litigants in contempt for failure to comply with an or-
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Under the rule, the judge may, but is not required to, order 
sanctions against litigants who have violated discovery proce-
dures.282 The rule, says Burbank, 
leaves it to the discretion of the court to pick from among a variety of 
sanctions, only partially enumerated, as the facts of the case may 
warrant. At least to the extent the Rule does no more than enumerate 
sanctions that might have been imposed by a federal court prior to 
1938, the Rule, since it makes no choices, is unexceptionable.283 
Professor Burbank then compares Rule 37 with Rules 6(b) 
(extending time to perform a required act)284 and 60(b) (relief 
from judgment),285 both of which grant discretion “to relieve the 
parties from effects of Rules regarding time limitations after an 
action has been commenced and judgments entered without no-
tice, that might otherwise be proscribed under the Act.”286 All of 
these provisions—Rules 37(b) and (d), 6(b), and 60(b)—preserve 
for the courts a feature of the common law method, which al-
lows judges some flexibility in applying the law to the facts in 
individual cases.287 As with Rule 13(a),288 Burbank sees federal 
common law as a way to uphold the validity of Rules 37(b) and 
(d) under his predictable-and-identifiable test.289 Because fed-
eral judges had been able to order sanctions even before the 
rules’ promulgation in 1938, Rules 37(b) and (d) are unobjec-
tionable to Burbank.290 
Professor Burbank is no doubt correct in asserting that the 
substantive provisions of Rule 37 are indeed discretionary.291 
What is less clear, however, is why the discretionary nature of 
any rule should matter in determining its validity under the 
Enabling Act. Indeed, focus on the discretionary nature of a 
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rule’s impact on substantive rights in determining the rule’s 
validity under the Enabling Act amounts to a complete non se-
quitur. 
The presence of a discretionary element should not control 
the inquiry into the validity of the rules. Assuming for argu-
ment’s sake that Burbank’s interpretation of the Enabling Act 
is sound, he fails to notice the wide opening his reliance on dis-
cretion leaves for the rule makers to achieve substantive re-
sults under the guise of procedure. Presumably the Supreme 
Court could promulgate a rule that would, for example, enable 
the judge to impose a cap on damages in a tort suit by a plain-
tiff who has violated a discovery order. Because the rule would 
be discretionary with the trial judge, Burbank would presuma-
bly have to find the rule valid—a preposterous result. 
Burbank’s reliance on the discretionary nature of the sanc-
tions provides a puzzling basis on which to determine the rules’ 
statutory validity. Whether the preclusive impact is automatic 
or discretionary with the court, the end result will often be the 
same: the use of substantive abridgement, explicitly authorized 
by the rules, as a sanction for a litigant’s failure to comply with 
a procedural directive. It appears to make little sense to have 
anything turn on the sanction’s tentative nature; in cases in 
which the judge does, in fact, impose the sanction, the preclu-
sive impact is identical. 
It may well be true, as Burbank argues, that prior to the 
rules’ promulgation district courts possessed discretionary 
common law power to impose preclusion as a sanction.292 But it 
is difficult to see from where in the statutory text or structure 
of the Enabling Act this factor can be discerned as an operative 
consideration in shaping the rulemaking power. 
If one carefully examines the historical basis for and prac-
tical implications of Burbank’s predictable-and-identifiable 
standard, it is revealed for the house of cards that it is. Pro-
ceeding from the flimsiest of bases in legislative history, the 
test (properly applied)293 has the effect of seriously restricting 
the rulemakers’ power to enforce the rules’ procedural direc-
tives. When Burbank has his standard recognize safety valves, 
it does so on the basis of completely imagined or rationally du-
bious factors. But the flaws of Burbank’s inquiry go much dee-
 
 292. Burbank, supra note 18, at 1184 n.729. 
 293. As we have demonstrated, Burbank himself is often unwilling to rec-
ognize the inexorable implications of his own approach. See supra Part 
II.B.4.c. 
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per than even these serious defects. By focusing his inquiry on 
a myopic effort to slavishly recreate legislative intent from leg-
islative history, he has ignored the commonsense implications 
of contextualist legislative interpretation. A contextualist in-
terpretation of the Enabling Act, to which we now turn, avoids 
all the problems caused by the narrow and counterproductive 
attempt to discern the actual intent of the enacting Congress by 
instead seeking only to facilitate objectively determined back-
ground purposes motivating the Act. 
5. Burlington Northern: A Contextualist Judge’s Destination 
Recall the two background purposes served by the Rules 
Enabling Act, uncovered by Professor Burbank’s own research: 
(1) preserving substantive policymaking in Congress and (2) fa-
cilitating creation of a uniform system of procedural rules.294 
Guided by these two purposes, a contextualist judge arrives 
basically at the same place at which the Court ended up in es-
tablishing its current interpretive framework in Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods.295 The Court in Burlington 
Northern was presented with two conflicting rules: Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and a provision of the Alabama 
Code.296 Rule 38 gave federal appellate courts discretion to im-
pose penalties for the filing of frivolous appeals.297 The Ala-
bama statute, in contrast, imposed an automatic ten percent 
penalty on the losing appellant in cases where “the judgment or 
decree [has been] affirmed without substantial modification.”298 
The discretionary nature of the federal rule thus conflicted with 
the Alabama statute in a way that arguably abridged prevail-
ing appellees’ substantive right to the mandatory ten percent 
recovery. The Court interpreted the limits of the Enabling Act 
to apply to the Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as the 
Rules of Civil Procedure.299 
 
 294. See supra Part II.A. 
 295. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 296. See id. at 3–4. 
 297. See id. at 4 (“If the court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is 
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appel-
lee.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 38)). 
 298. See id. at 4 (citing Chapman v. Rivers Constr. Co., 227 So. 2d 403, 
414–15 (1969)). 
 299. See id. at 5 n.3 (explaining that Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
“were also prescribed pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act”). The Enabling Act 
has since been amended explicitly to apply to rules applicable in federal appel-
late courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000). 
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To address the validity of Rule 38, the Court laid out the 
proper framework for judging the validity of rules under the 
Enabling Act. Therein lies the most significant contribution of 
the Burlington Northern opinion. The Court, instead of assum-
ing the mutual exclusivity of substance and procedure, ex-
plained that the Constitution and the Enabling Act both define 
the extent of rulemaking: “Article III of the Constitution, aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, § 8, cl. 
18, empowers Congress to establish a system of federal district 
and appellate courts and, impliedly, to establish procedural 
Rules governing litigation in these courts.”300 Thus, an indis-
putably procedural rule—for example, Rule 10(a), concerning 
captioning301—will simultaneously satisfy both the Constitu-
tion and the enabling provision of the Act. Equally easy is the 
case where a rule regulates only substance with nary a mention 
of procedure, which places the rule firmly outside the enabling 
provision.302 One example of the latter is a rule that establish-
es, without more, that a tort plaintiff may recover punitive 
damages without a showing of malice. 
A more complicated case, and the one that presents the in-
terpretive puzzle under the Enabling Act, is a rule falling 
somewhere between purely procedural and entirely substan-
tive. Rule 38, which regulated procedure in federal appellate 
courts but touched on the substantive right of prevailing appel-
lees to recover damages for having to defend the trial victory on 
appeal,303 was just such a rule. Under the Constitution, the 
Burlington Northern Court stated, the test is that of reasona-
bleness.304 Accordingly, rules that mix procedure and substance 
satisfy the Constitution when reasonably capable of classifica-
 
 300. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). Besides Article III, Section 1, which mentions 
“such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish,” and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the explicit Article 
I, Section 8 power to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1, art. I, § 8. See generally Kelleher, supra note 9, at 62–88 
(presenting an overview of the constitutional allocation of authority for regu-
lating procedure in federal courts). 
 301. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (“Every pleading must have a caption with the 
court’s name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation.”). 
 302. A purely substantive rule will violate the Enabling Act for failure to 
satisfy the enabling provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court 
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and 
rules of evidence . . . .”). 
 303. FED. R. CIV. P. 38. 
 304. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5. 
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tion as procedural.305 The Necessary and Proper Clause, after 
all, is capable of accommodating substantive components of 
procedural rules reasonably necessary to the operation of the 
federal court system.306 
Mixed rules, however, must also satisfy the Enabling Act, 
specifically the statute’s limiting provision.307 The Burlington 
Northern Court read the limitation in light of the broad pur-
poses underlying the Act, explaining: 
The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the development of a 
uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and 
procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ 
substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary 
to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.308 
The Court thus saw the limiting provision as carving out a 
portion of what the enabling provision authorized, but only to 
the extent that the rule’s effect on substantive rights was not 
“incidental.”309 This reading of the limiting provision effectively 
clarified the language by implicitly appending the following at 
the provision’s end: “but not if the effect on substantive rights 
is secondary to the achievement of a primary procedural pur-
pose.”310 Finally, the Court concluded that “the study and ap-
proval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, 
the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the statutory re-
quirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of 
review before taking effect give the Rules presumptive validity 
under both the constitutional and statutory constraints.”311 
 
 305. See id. 
 306. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all laws which shall be ne-
cessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all 
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United 
States, or in any department or officer thereof.”). 
 307. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S at 5. 
 308. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 
(1965); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946)). Al-
though both Murphree and Hanna mention the phrase “incidental effects”— 
the latter doing so only by citing Murphree—in neither decision has the Court 
gone through the trouble of explaining how the incidental effects test relates 
to broad purposes underlying the Enabling Act. See Hanna, 380 U.S. 460; 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438. Nor did these decisions have to do that, as the chal-
lenged Rules are wholly capable of being deemed purely procedural. See Han-
na, 380 U.S. 460; Murphree, 326 U.S. 438. This is why Professor Burbank is 
being less than careful when he says, “Burlington Northern reaffirmed the 
Court’s toothless interpretation of the Enabling Act.” Burbank, supra note 2, 
at 1018 n.37. 
 309. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5. 
 310. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 311. Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 6 (citation omitted). 
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This was similar to the conclusion of the Sibbach Court forty-
six years earlier.312 In a short paragraph, the Burlington 
Northern Court concluded Rule 38 did not violate the Enabling 
Act: “The choice made by the drafters of the Federal Rules in 
favor of a discretionary procedure affects only the process of en-
forcing litigants’ rights and not the rights themselves.”313 
In interpreting the procedural-substantive tension within 
the Enabling Act, the Burlington Northern Court recognized 
the allocative purpose of the Act—distributing powers between 
the Supreme Court and Congress—when it construed the limit-
ing provision to carve out rules that affect substantive rights.314 
However, the Court also recognized the importance of the pro-
cedural uniformity purpose.315 
This reading of the Enabling Act properly advances both 
purposes: (1) allocate substantive policy judgments to Congress 
while (2) enabling rulemaking that uses substantive compo-
nents incidental to attainment of the overriding procedural in-
terests in creating a uniform and effective system of procedural 
rules. The Court thus appropriately interpreted the Rules 
Enabling Act in light of the two broad purposes motivating the 
Act’s framers. Once the broader theory of interpretive contex-
tualism is added as conceptual support,316 the incidental-effects 
test can be seen to be by far the most effective means of con-
struing the statutory text to achieve statutory ends. 
III.  EXPLAINING AND REFINING THE INCIDENTAL-
EFFECTS TEST 
While the Burlington Northern standard effectively 
blended the two broad purposes served by the Act,317 the test is 
in need of further explanation and refinement. We do both in 
this Part. 
A. THE MEANING OF “INCIDENTAL” IN THE INCIDENTAL-EFFECTS 
TEST 
The word “incidental”—the key to understanding and ap-
plying the test—is capable of more than one plausible defini-
 
 312. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941). 
 313. Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 8. 
 314. Id. at 5. 
 315. See id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965); Miss. 
Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946)). 
 316. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 317. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 1. 
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tion. On the one hand, in this context it could mean a conse-
quence that accompanies the main occurrence unintentional-
ly—an unintended substantive spillover, as it were. The Oxford 
American Dictionary phrases this version of the definition as 
“occurring by chance in connection with something else.”318 
This meaning would obtain when, for example, the rulemakers 
could show that they did not, and perhaps could not, anticipate 
whatever effect on substantive rights to which a rule in practice 
gave rise. 
An alternative definition of “incidental” focuses on the pri-
macy of occurrences. Once again, according to the Oxford Amer-
ican Dictionary, “incidental” could mean “accompanying but not 
a major part of something.”319 This second meaning presuppos-
es a foresight that the incidental occurrence will take place, 
and perhaps even an intention on the part of the actor to bring 
about the occurrence. But the meaning relegates the occurrence 
to a secondary place; some other goal must be the primary 
driver. 
In the case of the federal rules, the term “incidental” may 
apply in either sense of the word. On the one hand, rules de-
signed solely for procedural purposes may inevitably but unin-
tentionally have spillover impact on substantive rights—that 
is, rights of litigants beyond the four walls of the courthouse.320 
For example, Rule 23, authorizing class actions, will inevitably 
impact the enforcement of substantive rights, thereby affecting 
issues of wealth redistribution and corporate behavior.321 In 
such a situation it makes perfect sense, in light of the Act’s un-
derlying purpose to achieve a uniform and coherent system of 
procedural justice in the federal courts, to authorize rules de-
 
 318. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 853 (Erin McKean ed. 2d ed. 
2005). 
 319. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “in-
cidental” as “[s]ubordinate to something of greater importance; having a minor 
role”). 
 320. Note that in a prior article, one of us has argued that, for this very 
reason, the Enabling Act’s vestiture of rulemaking authority in the unrepre-
sentative and unaccountable Supreme Court contravenes foundational dic-
tates of American democratic theory and constitutional law. See generally Re-
dish & Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1332. For present purposes, however, our 
analysis proceeds on the assumption of the Act’s constitutionality, consistent 
with controlling Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941). 
 321. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: 
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 93–107. 
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signed for procedural ends, even if they incidentally impact 
substantive rights. Because the substantive-procedural inter-
section will often be inevitable, any other construction of the 
Act would seriously interfere with the Court’s ability to fashion 
a coherent and uniform procedural system.322 
A potential awkwardness in this suggested construction is 
that the drafters themselves may well have failed to recognize 
the entire problem of incidental impact, because at the time of 
enactment they were proceeding on the fallacious assumption 
of substantive-procedural mutual exclusivity.323 Thus, use of a 
narrow intentionalist form of construction would likely fail to 
lead to acceptance of this first meaning of “incidental.” Howev-
er, once one recognizes the legal and practical reality that the 
Act’s framers themselves likely failed to recognize, a contex-
tualist recognizes the need for use of imaginative reconstruc-
tion.324 An interpreting judge must ask, how would a Congress 
aware of the inevitable but incidental substantive spillover of 
many procedural rules have chosen to shape the substantive-
procedural dichotomy in order to best achieve the Act’s two ba-
sic purposes? The answer appears obvious: because Congress 
sought to preserve its substantive lawmaking power, it is rea-
sonable to construe the Act to prohibit rules designed primarily 
or exclusively to alter substantive rights. Yet to prohibit rules 
having any substantive impact, no matter how incidental to 
procedure that impact may be, would seriously hinder the ru-
lemakers’ ability to fashion a uniform procedural system. The 
Act is therefore appropriately construed to permit creation of 
rules whose only impact on substantive rights is merely sec-
ondary to the primary procedural purpose. 
The interpretive issue is further complicated by the second 
conceivable definition of the term “incidental.” In addition to 
referring to an unintended spillover effect, the word could also 
be plausibly defined to include effects that are intermediary—
in other words, effects that are means to an end.325 Used in this 
 
 322. We should note, once again, that in this Article we are ignoring any 
conceivable constitutional problems in application of the Act. While one of us 
has previously raised such difficulties as a theoretical matter, see Redish & 
Amuluru, supra note 15, at 1327–32, at no point has the Court given the ar-
gument serious consideration. 
 323. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1113; Redish & Amuluru, supra note 
15, at 1311. 
 324. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 325. See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 853 (Erin McKean ed. 
2d ed. 2005); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1999). 
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sense, the word “incidental” in the Burlington Northern test 
would refer to the use of substantive impact in an instrumental 
sense—that is, as a method of ensuring litigant compliance 
with the rules’ underlying procedural goals. To employ the ex-
amples previously considered,326 Rule 13(a) (designed to 
achieve procedural efficiency by avoiding evidentiary duplica-
tion through use of a compulsory counterclaim rule to effective-
ly bring about litigant compliance)327 must have connected to it 
the substantive club of preclusion as a consequence for disobe-
dience. The same is true for the availability of substantive 
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery directives: absent 
the availability of the substantive club of factual establishment 
or dismissal,328 the discovery system, so central to the proce-
dural framework adopted in the federal rules, could not be as-
sured of functionality.329 In light of the underlying statutory 
goal of establishing a uniform and effective procedural system, 
it makes sense to construe the Act’s prohibition on substantive 
lawmaking to permit the rules to include such instrumental 
 
 326. See supra Part II.B.4.c.i. The phrase “incidental” in other areas of the 
law has already come to mean just that. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 
(7th ed. 1999) (defining “incidental power” as a “power that, although not ex-
pressly granted, must exist because it is necessary to the accomplishment of 
an express purpose”); id. at 128 (defining “incidental authority” as “[a]uthority 
needed to carry out actual or apparent authority” and using the following ex-
ample to illustrate the definition: “the actual authority to borrow money in-
cludes the incidental authority to sign commercial paper to bring about the 
loan”); cf. Stevens v. United States, 302 F.2d 158, 163 n.8 (5th Cir. 1962) (“The 
fact that an establishment is a dance hall does not make it taxable per se. It is 
necessary to show the serving or selling of food, refreshments, or merchandise 
is more than ‘merely incidental.’ . . . . ‘[I]incidental’ may have meanings in 
other contexts different from its meaning in this statute. In [Geer v. Birming-
ham, 88 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Iowa 1950),] . . . the selling of refreshments was 
‘merely incidental’, . . . [though it] represented 27 per cent of the ballroom's 
gross revenues and was an integral part of its operations. The quality that was 
present there was the subordinate relationship of the sale of refreshments to 
the principal feature of the ballroom, dancing . . . . We conclude that this sub-
ordinate relationship was the meaning intended by Congress in using the term 
‘incidental.’”). 
 327. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
 328. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d). 
 329. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962) (“The au-
thority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff ’ s action with prejudice be-
cause of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted. The power to in-
voke this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the 
disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the 
District Courts. The power is of ancient origin, having its roots in judgments of 
nonsuit and non prosequitur entered at common law . . . and dismissals for 
want of prosecution of bill in equity . . . .”). 
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uses of substantive consequences. Hence, to the extent the Bur-
lington Northern Court’s use of the term “incidental” was in-
tended to include both senses of the term, the decision’s inter-
pretive standard represents a legitimate exercise of the 
contextualist model of statutory construction. 
When commentators have attacked the Court’s Burlington 
Northern decision, they have done so by insisting on reading 
“incidental” as synonymous with “insubstantial” or “minimal.” 
Professor Whitten, for example, has criticized the decision by 
interpreting the word “incidental” in the Court’s test to mean 
“unimportant.”330 He argues, “under the Court’s view of the 
purposes of the Alabama statute and its statement about the 
Enabling Act, it is quite probable that the Alabama statute 
created substantive rights that were wholly, rather than inci-
dentally, undermined by the application of Rule 38 in its 
stead.”331 Whitten further argues that “[a] rule whose applica-
tion altogether prevents a damage recovery permitted by state 
law can hardly be described as only ‘incidentally’ affecting the 
right that the recovery aims at vindicating.”332 For his part, 
Professor Burbank seems to approve of Whitten’s analysis333 
and, in addition, relies on the Court’s acknowledgment in Mi-
stretta v. United States that rules have important effects on 
substantive rights to argue that the incidental-effects test, as 
applied by the Court, loses bite.334 
Whitten (and Burbank, to the extent he agrees with Whit-
ten) makes two critical mistakes in reading “incidental” as the 
equivalent of “insignificant.” First, Whitten applies the inciden-
tal-nonincidental dichotomy to state law,335 although it was in-
 
 330. See Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and 
Reappraisal After Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 1, 32–34 (1987). 
 331. Id. at 31. 
 332. Id. at 34. 
 333. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1018 & n.38 (citing approvingly Whit-
ten’s critique of Burlington Northern and describing Whitten as a “serious 
student of court rulemaking [who] regards Burlington Northern as a disas-
ter”). 
 334. See id. at 1042 n.189 (“So much for ‘incidental effects.’” (quoting Mi-
stretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989))). In Mistretta, the Court said in 
dictum that “this Court’s rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been subs-
tantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important 
effects on the substantive rights of litigants.” 488 U.S. at 392. 
 335. See Whitten, supra note 330, at 31 (“[I]t is quite probable that the Al-
abama statute created substantive rights that were wholly, rather than inci-
dentally, undermined by the application of Rule 38 in its stead.”). 
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tended to apply only to the federal rules themselves.336 The af-
fected state law is irrelevant under the Act. All that matters is 
whether the rules affect substantive rights incidentally, not 
whether the state law is wholly displaced by the rules them-
selves.337 Second, the Burlington Northern Court did not view 
the term “incidental” as “insignificant,” as is evidenced by its 
failure to assess the importance of Rule 38’s effect on substan-
tive rights protected by the Alabama statute.338 As Whitten 
himself showed, the Court did not invalidate a rule “whose ap-
plication altogether prevent[ed] a damage recovery permitted 
by state law.”339 
Even more fundamentally, the word “incidental” should not 
mean “insignificant” because the value of, for example, preclu-
sive rules deployed as discipline depends very much on how 
important their substantive effect is to a litigant.340 The effect 
on substantive rights is rather substantial when, as in the case 
of claim-preclusive sanctions, res judicata rules prevent liti-
gants from recovering on their precluded claims. What can be 
more important than that? But, as explained above, a dismissal 
with prejudice is precisely the kind of substantive club by 
which courts can encourage litigants to heed procedural direc-
tives.341 It makes little sense to prevent the federal system from 
employing important substantive encouragements because the 
more important the consequence, the more likely are litigants 
to comply with the federal courts’ procedures. Encouraging liti-
gant compliance with procedural rules only via unimportant 
consequences is tantamount to saying “please follow the rules 
or else,” when “or else” is nothing more than a slap on the 
wrist. Thus, “incidental” in the incidental-effects test, whatever 
else it might mean, does not mean “insignificant.” 
It is appropriate, at this point, to contrast this contextual-
ist construction of the Rules Enabling Act with the more inten-
tionalist “predictable-and-identifiable” standard advocated by 
Professor Burbank. Under that standard, we are left with an 
interpretation that makes little sense as a means of implement-
ing underlying statutory purposes. In contrast, by employing 
 
 336. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1987). 
 337. Professor Ely made a similar mistake. See supra II.B.3. 
 338. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 8. 
 339. Whitten, supra note 330, at 34. 
 340. But see Burbank, supra note 18 (arguing that preclusion is not a valid 
province of federal rules). 
 341. See supra Introduction. 
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those purposes as the interpretive equivalent of the North Star, 
we are far more effective in fashioning commonsense means of 
connecting concrete modes of statutory construction with foun-
dational legislative purposes. 
B. REMOVING THE PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY GLOSS 
Though we have sought to provide an intellectual founda-
tion on which to rationalize the incidental-effects test of Bur-
lington Northern, we strongly disagree with an important part 
of the decision. The Court erred by adding the gloss of pre-
sumptive—indeed, all but irrebuttable—validity to measure-
ment of rules under the standards of the Enabling Act. As the 
Court explained, “the study and approval given each proposed 
Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and 
this Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be re-
ported to Congress for a period of review before taking ef-
fect . . . give the Rules presumptive validity under both the con-
stitutional and statutory constraints.”342 The Court’s 
presumptive validity of Rule 38 perhaps explains its conclusory 
approval of the rule without examining whether the rule’s 
substantive effects were, in fact, truly incidental to an underly-
ing procedural goal.343 The incidental-effects test that the Court 
so effectively explicated in terms of the broad purpose in uni-
form and consistent federal procedure received insufficient con-
sideration with respect to Rule 38. 
Presumptive validity should not govern the rules’ validity 
under the Enabling Act for two reasons.344 First, as Justice 
Frankfurter powerfully argued in his Sibbach dissent, “to draw 
any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is 
to appeal to unreality.”345 The inertia in Congress lies squarely 
 
 342. Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 6. 
 343. The Court’s application of the enclave provision to Rule 38 was very 
cursory: “The choice made by the drafters of the Federal Rules in favor of a 
discretionary procedure affects only the process of enforcing litigants’ rights 
and not the rights themselves.” Id. at 8. But see Whitten, supra note 330, at 33 
(pointing out that the Alabama statute amounted to a right of action “against 
an appellant for unsuccessful appellate litigation”). The Court must have in-
tended to imply in its reasoning that whatever effect Rule 38 has on the Ala-
bama statute is purely incidental. A more nuanced analysis would have been 
helpful in light of the Court’s clear statement of how the enclave is to be inter-
preted. The presumptive validity gloss is the likely explanation for the Court’s 
failure. 
 344. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1101–02 (arguing that the presump-
tive validity notion is a dubious assumption); Kelleher, supra note 9, at 99. 
 345. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
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in favor of inaction. To presume from such inaction an affirma-
tive desire to approve a proposed rule has the same shaky 
foundation that partially underpins the so-called Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine—both fail to recognize that the con-
stitutional inertia in Congress favors inaction.346 Moreover, 
when we ask whether a rule promulgated in, say, 2006 satisfies 
the 1934 Enabling Act, why should it matter that the rule has 
received tacit approval of the 2006 Congress? 
Second, the presumptive validity gloss draws on the 
Court’s approval at times when the Court is at its weakest. 
Generally, as one of us has previously noted, the “federal courts 
were constitutionally constructed as passive entities,” thus 
needing two or more adverse litigants for a sharp presentation 
of all sides of any given issue.347 By design, the Court’s role in 
rulemaking takes place in a non-adversarial setting.348 While 
the more public form of rule adoption now employed by the Ad-
visory Committee may often approximate an adversary explo-
ration of such issues, this may not always be the case, and in 
any event the process would not take place before the Court it-
self. Moreover, it is important to note that no such public 
process took place for the vast majority of the existing rules. 
The Court’s imprimatur to a particular rule, then, comes 
without a formalized and careful adversary presentation of all 
sides of the issue of the rule’s validity. 
CONCLUSION 
In more than seven decades since the original passage of 
the Rules Enabling Act, the procedural-substantive tension 
embedded in the Act has escaped conclusive interpretation. 
Partially to blame is the tension itself, which lends itself to 
three textually plausible interpretations. But an additional 
part of the explanation for the lack of resolution is the absence 
of a careful analysis of the Act in light of the theories of statu-
 
senting). Justice Frankfurter discarded the presumption of validity based on 
“due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions sur-
rounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted.” Id. 
 346. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 
592–93. 
 347. See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Ac-
tions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicato-
ry Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 574–75 (2006). 
 348. For an explanation of rulemaking under the Enabling Act, see Duff, 
supra note 5. 
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tory interpretation. To that end, this Article, by examining the 
various interpretations of the Act, gleans an important lesson 
in statutory interpretation. The Enabling Act, standing in for 
all sparsely worded ambiguous statutes, is the proverbial post-
er child for a contextualist analysis that relies on objective pur-
poses to inform textual ambiguities. Only through a contextual-
ist interpretation can an interpreter appreciate the forest—the 
overall goals sought to be attained by the Rules Enabling Act—
rather than the trees. 
In this Article, we have sought to contribute to the litera-
ture on two levels. On the most immediate level, the Article 
stands as an original theoretical defense of the often maligned 
incidental-effects construction of the Rules Enabling Act’s subs-
tantive-procedural tension that characterizes current Supreme 
Court doctrine, and as the addition of a critical perspective on 
alternative interpretational standards. But we have sought to 
accomplish these goals by placing Rules Enabling Act construc-
tion within the broader framework of statutory interpretation 
theory. By use of such an approach, we have sought to advance 
understanding of both statutory interpretation in general and 
the Rules Enabling Act in particular. The lesson for statutory 
interpretation theory largely parallels the lesson to be learned 
in construing the Rules Enabling Act. In both, when dealing 
with ambiguous legislation, it is common sense and an attempt 
to translate underlying purpose into legal reality, rather than 
narrow, shortsighted adherence to textual literalism or legisla-
tive history, that more effectively further the goals of repre-
sentative democracy. 
